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I. Introduction 
 
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that “everyone has 
the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”1 To 
establish an infringement of s. 7, it is necessary to establish first, that state action has 
resulted in depriving an individual of their life, liberty or security of the person and 
second, that this deprivation was achieved in a manner inconsistent with one or more 
principles of fundamental justice. This article focuses on the first step of the analysis: 
whether proceedings under Canada’s immigration and refugee protection laws 
engage the life, liberty or security of the person of non-citizens. 
 
The very first case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada involving a s. 7 
claim outside of the criminal context was Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration).2 Three of six judges recognized that the denial of a Convention 
refugee’s right under the Immigration Act, 1976 not to be removed from Canada to a 
country where his life or freedom would be threatened amounted to a deprivation of 
his security of the person within the meaning of s. 7. Justice Bertha Wilson’s 
judgment in Singh is remarkable in several ways.3 It established that the word 
“everyone” in s. 7 applies to “every human being physically present in Canada and 
by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law.” It recognized that “security 
of the person” encompasses not only freedom from physical punishment or suffering 
but freedom from the threat of such punishment. In determining whether s. 7 of the 
Charter applied to government acts, it refused to embrace the distinction between 
acts said to impact “rights” and those affecting “mere privileges”, focusing instead 
on their consequences for the affected person’s s. 7 interests.  
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba. I thank my colleagues Professors Audrey 
Macklin and Colin Grey for their comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. I also thank the 
anonymous reviewers and the editorial staff of the University of New Brunswick Law Journal for their 
efforts in preparing this article for publication. All errors and omissions are mine alone.  
 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
 
2  Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 SCR 177, 17 DLR 4th 422 
[Singh]. 
 
3 See generally Catherine Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing 
Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence” (2013) 58 McGill LJ 663 at 668–671 
[Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed”]. 
2017] REVISITING THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 7 
 
 
 
313 
Over thirty years later, significant questions remain about the application of 
s. 7 in the sphere of immigration and refugee law. Following over a decade of 
inconsistent Federal Court of Appeal decisions on whether the right to liberty was 
engaged by immigration and refugee proceedings, the Supreme Court laconically 
declared that “the deportation of a non-citizen in itself cannot implicate the liberty 
and security interests protected by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.”4 Two years later, it adjusted its position, holding that “[w]hile the 
deportation of a non-citizen in the immigration context may not in itself engage s. 7 
of the Charter, some features associated with deportation, such as detention in the 
course of the [security] certificate process or the prospect of deportation to torture, 
may do so.”5 More recently, the Supreme Court appeared to endorse, in obiter, the 
view that liberty and security of the person are not engaged in the earlier decision 
making stages of the immigration and refugee protection regime so long as these 
interests can be considered in proceedings that immediately precede removal.6 Thus, 
s. 7 was not engaged at the stage of determining whether a refugee claimant was 
inadmissible to Canada because the claimant had access to a subsequent pre-removal 
risk assessment where the risk of removal to face death, torture or cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment would be considered and s. 7 would be engaged.7 In a 
recent decision, the Federal Court of Appeal held that to decide whether a bar on pre-
removal risk assessments filed within a year of the rejection of a refugee protection 
claim violated a non-citizen’s s. 7 right to security of the person, it would be 
necessary to revisit the reasoning underlying the thirty-year-old Singh judgment.8 
 
In this article, I provide a brief and general overview of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on the application of s. 7. Against this background, I take 
stock of and critically assess, in historical context, the current state of the law on the 
engagement of liberty and security of the person in immigration and refugee 
proceedings. I conclude that in the refugee and immigration context, Canadian courts 
have adopted a narrow approach to the engagement of s. 7 that is inconsistent with 
their approach in the cognate areas of criminal law and extradition law and for which 
they have failed to articulate a transparent and principled justification.  
 
I examine four aspects of the s. 7 engagement jurisprudence that illustrate 
this inconsistency and cry out for a principled reappraisal by the Supreme Court. 
                                                 
4 Medovarksi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); Esteban v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51 at para 46, [2005] 2 SCR 539 [Medovarksi]. 
 
5 Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para 17, [2007] 1 SCR 351 
[Charkaoui]. 
 
6 B010 v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58, 390 DLR (4th) 385 [B010]. 
 
7 Ibid at para 75. 
 
8 Peter v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness); Savunthararasa v Canada 
(Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FCA 51 at paras 28–29, 395 DLR (4th) 
758 [Savunthararasa]. 
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First, the Federal Court of Appeal’s inconsistent early jurisprudence on whether s. 7 
is engaged in immigration and refugee proceedings was marked by persistent 
confusion between two distinct components of s. 7 analysis: whether these 
proceedings engage non-citizens’ life, liberty and security of the person and whether, 
viewed in their statutory context, they offend principles of fundamental justice. The 
Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal have continued to rely on some of these 
early decisions, which are ripe for re-examination. Second, the Supreme Court’s bald 
assertion in Medovarski that the deportation of non-citizens does not, in itself, 
implicate their liberty and security of the person fails to address key arguments, 
some grounded in the Court’s own s. 7 jurisprudence, that support s. 7 engagement. 
As recognized in some Federal Court of Appeal judgments, immigration and refugee 
protection proceedings involve the threat of detention incidental to forced removal. 
The possibility of detention engages liberty in the extradition and penal contexts 
which, with the advent of “crimmigration” – the convergence of criminal law and 
immigration law – are not far removed from the context of removal proceedings. 
Deportation can also engage non-citizens’ liberty by preventing them from making 
fundamental personal choices, such as nurturing or caring for their Canadian-born 
children, that go beyond the bare assertion of mobility rights. Interference with such 
profoundly intimate choices could also produce an effect on non-citizens’ 
psychological integrity serious and profound enough to engage their security of the 
person. Third, more than thirty years after Singh, uncertainty persists on whether 
non-citizens’ security of the person is engaged in any circumstance where 
deportation places them at risk of persecution, torture or cruel and unusual 
punishment or whether s. 7 engagement hinges on non-citizens’ ability to establish a 
violation of their statutory rights. While the Supreme Court has hinted in some of its 
judgments that non-citizens’ right not to be deprived of their security of the person 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice is a freestanding 
constitutional right, it has not yet expressly and unequivocally addressed this 
fundamental aspect of s. 7 engagement. Finally, by opining that s. 7 does not apply to 
determinations of exclusion or inadmissibility because these proceedings are not 
sufficiently proximate to removal, the Supreme Court has without justification 
imposed in the immigration and refugee protection context a standard of causation 
more onerous than that which it applies for s. 7 engagement generally. 
 
In my concluding remarks, I briefly address how a principled approach to s. 
7 engagement in immigration and refugee protection decision making could make a 
real difference for non-citizens who seek to challenge their removal from Canada. 
Abandoning the narrow approach to s. 7 engagement in this context would shift the 
courts’ focus to the crucial question of whether the state has interfered with non-
citizens’ liberty and security of the person in a manner rationally connected and 
proportionate to the objectives of Canada’s immigration laws, as required by our 
fundamental constitutional values. 
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II. The scope of application of section 7 of the Charter: a brief overview 
 
To demonstrate a violation of s. 7, one must establish, first, that a law or state action 
interferes with or deprives natural persons9 present in Canada and thus subject to 
Canadian law10 of their life, liberty or security of the person11 and, second, that this 
deprivation is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.12 This 
part summarizes the state of the law on the question of whether s. 7 is engaged, the 
first of these issues, through a review of leading cases decided in a variety of 
contexts touching on the administration of justice. 
 
 
1. State action implicating the administration of justice 
 
The dominant strand of jurisprudence on s. 7 sees its purpose as guarding against the 
kinds of deprivation of life, liberty and security of the person “that occur as a result 
of an individual’s interaction with the justice system and its administration,”13 a term 
which refers to “the state’s conduct in the course of enforcing and securing 
compliance with the law.”14 Thus, s. 7 protects against measures that can be 
attributed to state action implicating the “administration of justice,”15 broadly 
interpreted by the Court as extending beyond processes operating in the criminal law 
sphere16 to the investigation of complaints of discrimination under human rights 
legislation,17 parental rights in relation to state-imposed medical treatment18 and in 
                                                 
9 Irwin Toy Ltd v Québec (AG), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 1002–3, 58 DLR (4th) 577. 
 
10 Singh, supra note 2 at para 35. Exceptionally, the Charter may apply to the actions of state agents 
participating in activities of a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s international 
obligations: Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 28 at para 18, [2008] 2 SCR 125. 
 
11 Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5 at para 55, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter]. 
 
12 Ibid at para 35. 
 
13 Gosselin v Quebec (AG), 2002 SCC 84 at para 77, [2002] 4 SCR 429 [Gosselin]. 
 
14 Ibid, citing New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G(J), [1999] 3 SCR 46 at 
79, 216 NBR (2d) 25 [G(J)]. While some Supreme Court judges have expressly argued in favour of 
extending the application of s. 7 to contexts other than those linked to the administration of justice, this 
position has not in my view clearly been adopted by a majority of the Court: Chaoulli v Quebec (AG), 
2005 SCC 35 at paras 195–199, [2005] 1 SCR 791 [Chaoulli] per Binnie, LeBel and Fish JJ; see Gerald 
Heckman, “Charte Canadienne: droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de la personne et justice 
fondamentale” in Stéphane Beaulac & Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, eds, Jurisclasseur Québec – 
Collection Droit Public – Droit Constitutionnel (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2015) at para 9. 
 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Ibid at para 78. 
 
17 Ibid, citing Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 SCR 307 
[Blencoe]. 
 
18 B(R) v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315, 21 OR (3d) 479 [B(R)]. 
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the child custody process19 and the right to refuse state-imposed addiction 
treatment.20 Canada’s conduct in enforcing and securing non-citizens’ compliance 
with its immigration laws falls well within this concept of administration of justice. 
 
 
2. Life, Liberty and Security of the Person 
 
 
(a) Life 
 
The right to life under s. 7 is engaged where a law or state action imposes death or an 
increased risk of death on a person, either directly or indirectly.21 State measures that 
interfere with patients’ timely access to potentially life-saving medical care have 
been found to engage the right to life.22 Deporting a refugee “where there are 
grounds to believe that this would subject the refugee to a substantial risk of torture” 
would also violate the guarantee of life, liberty and security of the person.23 
 
 
(b) Liberty 
 
The right to liberty is engaged where the state subjects an individual to physical 
restraint or to the threat of physical restraint. An offense has the potential of 
depriving persons of their liberty and engages s. 7 “as of the moment it is open to the 
judge to impose imprisonment”: there is no need that imprisonment “be made 
mandatory.”24 Immigration detention, such as that provided under the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act25 for individuals designated by a security certificate, also 
engages liberty.26 
 
The s. 7 liberty interest is no longer restricted to “mere freedom from 
physical restraint” but is engaged “where state compulsions or prohibitions affect 
                                                 
19 G(J), supra note 14. 
 
20 Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v DFG, [1997] 3 SCR 925, 121 Man R (2d) 241. 
 
21 Carter, supra note 11 at para 62. 
 
22 See Chaoulli, supra note 14 at para 62 (prohibition on the purchase of private health insurance) and 
Canada (AG) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44 at para 91, [2011] 3 SCR 134 [PHS] 
(measures preventing health professionals from offering medical supervision and counselling to their 
addicted clients at a safe injection site). 
 
23 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 at para 129, [2002] 1 SCR 3 
[Suresh]. 
 
24 Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s 94(2), [1985] 2 SCR 486 at 79, 24 DLR (4th) 536 
[Motor Vehicle Reference]. 
 
25 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c. 27 [IRPA]. 
 
26 As the Supreme Court held in Charkaoui, supra note 5 at para 13: “The provisions at issue… clearly 
deprive detainees such as the appellants of their liberty. The person named in a certificate can face 
detention pending the outcome of the proceedings.” 
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important and fundamental life choices.”27 For example, the Identification of 
Criminals Act, which provided for the fingerprinting of persons charged with but not 
convicted of an offense, engaged their right to liberty because it “require[d] a person 
to appear at a specific time and place and oblige[d] that person to go through an 
identification process on pain of imprisonment for failure to comply.”28 Similarly, 
the statutory power of an administrative tribunal to compel any person “to appear at 
a specific time and place to testify subject to legal consequences for failure to 
comply” constitutes a deprivation of liberty and engages s. 7 of the Charter. 29 
 
The right to liberty “protects within its ambit the right to an irreducible 
sphere of personal autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently private 
choices free from state interference.”30 It does not guarantee unconstrained freedom 
nor protect any and all decisions that individuals may make in conducting their 
affairs. Rather, it encompasses only those matters “that can properly be characterized 
as fundamentally or inherently personal such that, by their very nature, they 
implicate basic choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy individual dignity 
and independence.”31  
 
 
(c) Security of the person 
 
Security of the person “encompasses ‘a notion of personal autonomy involving… 
control of one’s bodily integrity free from state interference’ […] and it is engaged 
by state interference with an individual’s physical or psychological integrity, 
including any state action that causes physical or serious psychological suffering.”32 
                                                 
27 Blencoe, supra note 17 at para 49. 
 
28 R v Beare; R v Higgins, [1988] 2 SCR 387 at 402, 71 Sask R 1 [Beare] cited in Blencoe, supra note 17 
at para 49. 
 
29 Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade 
Practices Commission), [1990] 1 SCR 425 at 573 (L’Heureux-Dubé J), cited in Blencoe, supra note 17 at 
para 49 [Thomson]. The relevant statute gave the members of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission 
the authority to order any person to be examined upon oath before a member and to exercise the powers of 
a superior court for the enforcement of subpoenas to witnesses “or punishment of disobedience thereof”: 
ibid, at para 24. 
 
30 Godbout v Longeuil (City), [1997] 3 SCR 844 at para 66, 152 DLR (4th) 577 [Godbout] per La Forest J, 
writing for L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ, cited with approval by a majority of the Court in Blencoe, 
supra note 17 at para 51. 
 
31 Ibid. By denying individuals with grievous and irremediable medical conditions the right to request a 
physician’s assistance in dying, the Criminal Code’s prohibition on assisted suicide interfered “with their 
ability to make decisions concerning their bodily integrity and medical care and thus trenche[d] on 
liberty”: Carter, supra note 11 at para 66. Several Supreme Court judges (but not a majority) would have 
recognized that the right to liberty encompassed the right of parents to make decisions regarding the 
medical care provided to their children and a person’s right to choose where to establish his or her home: 
respectively, B(R), supra note 18 and Godbout, supra note 30 at paras 66–67. 
 
32 Carter, supra note 11 at para 64 [case citations omitted]. 
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Security of the person is engaged by state action that interferes with 
individuals’ physical integrity. Delays inherent in the Criminal Code regime 
governing the provision of therapeutic abortions increased the risk of medical 
complications and mortality and infringed the physical aspect of women’s right to 
security of the person.33 Similarly, legislation that prohibited patients from 
purchasing private medical insurance and forced them to accept delays in the public 
medical system denied them timely access to care “for a condition… clinically 
significant to their current and future health,” adversely impacted their physical and 
psychological health and engaged their security of the person.34 Security of the 
person encompasses “freedom from the threat of physical punishment or suffering as 
well as freedom from such punishment itself.”35 Accordingly, denying a Convention 
refugee the right under Canada’s Immigration Act, 1976 not to be removed to a 
country “where his life or freedom would be threatened” would amount to a 
deprivation of security of the person.36 
 
State action that has a serious and profound effect on a person’s 
psychological integrity restricts that person’s security of the person. The effects of 
the state’s interference, assessed objectively “with a view to their impact on the 
psychological integrity of a person of reasonable sensibility,”37 need not rise to the 
level of “nervous shock or psychiatric illness,” but must be greater than “ordinary 
stress or anxiety.”38 Security of the person will be violated only by serious 
psychological incursions resulting from state interference with an individual interest 
of fundamental importance or, in other words, the profoundly intimate and personal 
choices of an individual.39 Breaches of security of the person were found where the 
state interfered with a woman’s choice to end her pregnancy,40 a person’s choice to 
end her life41 and a parent’s interest in raising and caring for a child.42 Such 
                                                 
33 R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 at 59, 63 OR (3d) 281 [Morgentaler]. 
 
34 Chaoulli, supra note 14 at para 123 per McLachlin CJ and Major and Bastarache JJ and at paras 191, 
203–6 per Binnie, LeBel and Fish JJ. By prohibiting medical marijuana users from choosing methods of 
administration of the drug other than smoking dry marijuana, Parliament breached their right to security of 
the person by subjecting them to the risk of cancer and bronchial infections and forcing them to choose 
between legal and inadequate treatment and an illegal but more effective choice: R. v Smith, 2015 SCC 34 
at para 18, [2015] 2 SCR 602. Similarly, Criminal Code prohibitions on bawdy houses, living on the 
avails of prostitution and communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution engaged prostitutes’ 
security of the person by preventing them from taking steps to protect themselves from the risks inherent 
in prostitution, thereby heightening the risk of disease, violence and death: Canada (AG) v Bedford, 2013 
SCC 72 at paras 60, 88, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 [Bedford]. 
 
35 Singh, supra note 2 at 207 per Wilson J (Dickson CJ and Lamer J concurring). 
 
36 Ibid. 
 
37 G(J), supra note 14 at para 60. 
 
38 Ibid. 
 
39 Blencoe, supra note 17 at paras 82–83. 
 
40 Morgentaler, supra note 33. 
 
41 Carter, supra note 11 at paras 64–66. 
 
42 G(J), supra note 14 at para 61. 
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fundamental personal choices “would not easily include the type of stress, anxiety 
and stigma that result from administrative or civil proceedings.”43 
 
 
3. Causation 
 
Section 7 is engaged only if a law or state action is the causal source of an 
interference with a rights claimant’s life, liberty or security of the person. The rights 
claimant must establish “a sufficient causal connection” between the state-caused 
effect and the prejudice suffered by the claimant: 
 
A sufficient causal connection standard does not require that the impugned 
government action or law be the only or the dominant cause of the 
prejudice suffered by the claimant, and is satisfied by a reasonable 
inference, drawn on a balance of probabilities… A sufficient causal 
connection is sensitive to the context of the particular case and insists on a 
real, as opposed to a speculative, link.44 
 
In Bedford the Supreme Court rejected a higher standard of causation that would 
have required the rights claimant to show that the state action was a foreseeable and 
necessary cause of the prejudice to the claimant’s security interest. In its view, a 
“sufficient causal connection” represented a fair and workable threshold for 
engaging s. 7 of the Charter: 
 
This is the port of entry for s. 7 claims. The claimant bears the burden of 
establishing this connection. Even if established, it does not end the 
inquiry, since the claimant must go on to show that the deprivation of her 
security of the person is not in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. Although mere speculation will not suffice to 
establish causation, to set the bar too high risks barring meritorious claims. 
What is required is a sufficient connection, having regard to the context of 
the case.45 
 
 Over the Charter’s 35-year history, the Supreme Court has gradually eased 
the threshold for the engagement of s. 7. In particular, it has broadened the scope of 
liberty and security of the person and adopted a relatively low standard of causation. 
In the next part of my paper, I argue that in the immigration and refugee protection 
                                                 
43 Blencoe, supra note 17 at para 83. Despite the personal hardship endured by the respondent to a human 
rights complaint in the face of significant delay in a human rights commission’s investigation of the 
complaint, including the stigma associated with the complaint, the depletion of his financial resources and 
the associated physical and psychological suffering, there was no breach of security of the person because 
the state had not interfered with the respondent and his family’s ability to make essential life choices: ibid 
at para 86. 
 
44 Bedford, supra note 34 at para 76.  
 
45 Ibid at para 78. 
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context, the Court has, without acknowledgement or justification, resiled from this 
more relaxed approach to the engagement of s. 7. 
 
 
III. The application of s. 7 in immigration and refugee law – a critical appraisal 
 
Against the background of the Court’s current approach to the engagement of s. 7, 
this part focuses on how courts have dealt with the question of whether liberty and 
security of the person are engaged in immigration and refugee protection 
proceedings and with the issue of causation. Each section begins with a review of the 
foundational cases that marked the evolution of the jurisprudence in this context, 
including early Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal decisions. Some of these 
remain relevant today not only as historical context but because, unlike some recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court, they squarely address the impact of removal on non-
citizens’ s. 7 interests. Indeed, Federal Court judges still return to some of these 
precedents when resolving claims of s. 7 engagement. 
 
 
1. Liberty 
 
Early Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal decisions were split on whether the 
removal of non-citizens engaged their liberty interest. One line of jurisprudence 
recognized that forcibly deporting someone against his will necessarily interfered 
with his liberty, while other decisions found no engagement of liberty. This was due 
in large measure to a misreading of Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration),46 a decision in which, as noted in the following section, the Supreme 
Court had expressly declined to address the question of s. 7 engagement. 
 
 
(a) Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 
 
In Chiarelli, the Supreme Court first considered, without deciding, whether the right 
to liberty is engaged in proceedings leading to non-citizens’ removal from Canada. 
To this day, the judgment casts a long shadow over s. 7 jurisprudence in the context 
of immigration and refugee law.47 When Chiarelli, a permanent resident who arrived 
in Canada at age 15, was convicted of a serious criminal offense, a deportation order 
was issued against him. He asked the Immigration Appeal Board to set aside the 
order on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Before the Board could hear the 
appeal, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), at the behest of the 
Canadian government, inquired into whether Chiarelli was likely to engage in 
organized crime if allowed to remain in Canada. Relying on the SIRC’s findings, the 
                                                 
46 Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1992] 1 SCR 711, 90 DLR (4th) 289 
[Chiarelli]. 
 
47 See, generally, Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed”, supra note 3 at 680–2. See also Catherine 
Dauvergne, Humanitarianism, Identity and Nation: Migration Laws of Australia and Canada (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2005) at 202ff [Dauvergne, Humanitarianism, Identity and Nation]. 
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Minister of Employment and Immigration issued a certificate with the result that 
Chiarelli’s appeal on humanitarian and compassionate grounds was dismissed.  
 
Chiarelli contested the constitutionality of the scheme on several grounds, 
including that reliance upon the certificate deprived him of his liberty under s. 7 
through a process that did not accord with fundamental justice.48 All three Federal 
Court of Appeal judges agreed that s. 7 was engaged: 
 
The filing of the certificate had the effect of depriving the Immigration 
Appeal Board of its power to allow the appellant’s appeal on 
compassionate grounds. This, in itself, did not directly interfere with the 
appellant’s right to life, liberty and security of the person. However, if 
things are looked at realistically, it cannot be denied that, as a result of the 
filing of the certificate, the appellant will be deported to Italy while he 
otherwise might have been allowed to remain in the country. As, in my 
view, deportation necessarily implies an interference with the liberty of 
the person, I would say that a violation of section 7 of the Charter has 
been established.49 
 
The Supreme Court declined to decide “whether deportation per se engages s. 7, that 
is, whether it amounts to a deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person” 
because it found no breach of the principles of fundamental justice.50 To determine 
the scope of these principles, Justice Sopinka adopted a contextual approach to 
Charter interpretation and looked to the principles and policies underlying 
immigration law including “the most fundamental principle of immigration law… 
that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the 
country.”51 The requirement that permanent residents not be convicted of a serious 
criminal offence was a “legitimate, non-arbitrary choice by Parliament of a situation 
in which it is not in the public interest to allow a non-citizen to remain in the 
country.”52 Where non-citizens deliberately violated essential conditions under 
which they could remain in Canada, giving practical effect, through deportation, to 
the termination of their right to remain did not breach fundamental justice,53 nor did 
                                                 
48 The SIRC hearing was held, in part, in camera and in the absence of Chiarelli and his counsel.  
 
49 Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 2 FCR 299 at 318–19, 67 DLR 
(4th) 697 [Chiarelli FCA] per Pratte JA, dissenting but not on this point. Stone and Urie JJA agreed with 
Pratte JA on the engagement of s. 7 and with his finding that the SIRC hearing did not accord with the 
principles of fundamental justice but disagreed with his conclusion that the breach of s. 7 was justified 
under s. 1 of the Charter. 
 
50 Chiarelli, supra note 46 at 731–2. 
 
51 Ibid at 733. 
 
52 Ibid at 734. 
 
53 Ibid. The Court stated that it was “not necessary, in order to comply with fundamental justice, to look 
beyond this fact [of a deliberate violation of the prohibition on committing serious crimes] to other 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” 
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the absence of a compassionate appeal from the deportation order.54 Finally, the 
SIRC procedure did not violate principles of fundamental justice.55 Thus, Chiarelli 
established that it was not in itself fundamentally unjust for Parliament to devise 
criteria to govern the entry and residency of non-citizens in Canada, as contemplated 
by the Charter’s stipulation of differing mobility rights for citizens and non-
citizens,56 and to provide for their enforcement. Non-citizens’ lack of an unqualified 
right to enter or remain in Canada supplied the context which informed the scope of 
the principles of fundamental justice. However, the Court did not tie this 
“fundamental principle of immigration law” to the scope of liberty or security of the 
person. It very deliberately made no decision on the engagement of s. 7. 
 
 
(b) Conflicting decisions at the Federal Court of Appeal 
 
Around the time that Chiarelli was before the Supreme Court, the Federal Court of 
Appeal issued conflicting decisions on whether proceedings involving the potential 
removal of non-citizens engaged their right to liberty. In Grewal v Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Immigration),57 a permanent resident being deported to India for 
criminal activity unsuccessfully appealed the deportation to the Immigration Appeal 
Board. His application to the Minister for humanitarian and compassionate relief was 
also dismissed. Finally, an immigration adjudicator refused to re-open the 
immigration inquiry at which he had been ordered deported so that he might register 
a refugee claim. Grewal argued that, in his circumstances, s. 7 required the re-
opening. Following its decision in Chiarelli, the Federal Court of Appeal accepted 
that s. 7 applied: 
 
It has already been determined that the deportation of refugees infringes 
their right to security of the person. (Singh…). This, of course, does not 
mean that people cannot be deported for good reason, that is, as long as 
there is no violation of the principles of fundamental justice … 
Hence, it is permissible to deport a permanent resident for the commission 
of a serious offence without violating the Charter, as long as fundamental 
justice has been accorded to that person before doing so. … The 
legislation and the earlier jurisprudence of this court must yield to the 
dictates of section 7.58 
 
In Hoang v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),59 a 
permanent resident of Vietnamese origin previously recognized as a Convention 
                                                 
54 Ibid at 739. Significantly, a ministerial humanitarian and compassionate review would still have been 
available to Chiarelli under s. 114(2) of the Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c I-2, s 114(2). 
 
55 Ibid at 746. 
 
56 Ibid at 733–4. 
 
57 Grewal v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FCR 581, 85 DLR (4th) 166 
(CA) [Grewal].  
 
58 Ibid at 587–8. 
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refugee unsuccessfully appealed a removal order issued against him as a result of 
convictions for serious criminal offenses. Before the Federal Court of Appeal, he 
argued that in light of his possible deportation to Vietnam, the procedures mandated 
by the Immigration Act violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter. Justice MacGuigan 
quoted at length from the Federal Court of Appeal’s conclusion in Chiarelli that a 
deportation order made against a permanent resident as a result of a conviction was 
not contrary to s. 7 because: 
 
There is no injustice in requiring the deportation of a person who has lost 
the right to remain in the country; there is no injustice, either, in 
prescribing that a foreigner who has been admitted here as a permanent 
resident will lose the right to remain in the country if he is found guilty of 
an offence which, in itself, Parliament considers to be serious.60 
 
In this passage from Chiarelli, the Federal Court of Appeal rejected Chiarelli’s s. 7 
claim because he had not shown that the removal of persons convicted of a serious 
offense “raised any injustice” or, in other words, violated fundamental justice. It did 
not find that s. 7 was not engaged. Nevertheless, without adverting to the Federal 
Court of Appeal’s unanimous view in Chiarelli that deportation “necessarily implies 
an interference with the liberty of the person,” Justice MacGuigan erroneously 
concluded that “… on the authority of Hurd and Chiarelli, deportation for serious 
offenses affect neither s. 7 nor s. 12 rights, since it is not to be conceptualized as 
either a deprivation of liberty or a punishment.”61 
 
The Federal Court of Appeal compounded this error in Canepa v Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration),62 once again dismissing the argument 
that the removal of a permanent resident who had established a substantial 
connection with Canada engaged s. 7. Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had, 
in Chiarelli, “left open the question whether deportation for serious offences can be 
conceptualized as a deprivation of liberty under s. 7,” Justice MacGuigan reasoned 
that the Court of Appeal had answered that question in the negative in Hoang and 
was “bound by its previous decisions,”63 a conclusion he reiterated in Barrera v 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),64 which involved a proceeding 
                                                                                                                   
59 Hoang v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 13 Imm LR (2d) 35, 42 ACWS 
(3d) 1140 [Hoang]. 
 
60 Chiarelli FCA, supra note 49 at 310 [emphasis added]. 
 
61 Hoang, supra note 59 at 41. In Hurd v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 
FCR 594, 12 ACWS (3d) 328 (CA), the Federal Court of Appeal determined that deportation proceedings 
were not proceedings that could lead to truly penal consequences and to which s. 11(h) of the Charter 
could apply. 
 
62 Canepa v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 3 FCR 270, 93 DLR (4th) 589 
leave to appeal dismissed, [1993] 1 SCR v, [1992] SCCA No. 410 [Canepa]. 
 
63 Ibid at 277. 
 
64 Barrera v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 2 FCR 3, 99 DLR (4th) 264. 
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to deport a Convention refugee as a result of serious criminal convictions. To the 
extent they rely exclusively on the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Chiarelli 
for the proposition that deportation does not engage non-citizens’ liberty interest, 
Hoang, Canepa and Barrera were based on a misreading of that decision and were 
wrongly decided. 
 
The question of the application of s. 7 to proceedings under the Immigration 
Act was once again considered by the Federal Court of Appeal in Nguyen v Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration).65 Nguyen, a landed immigrant convicted 
of serious criminal offenses, challenged the constitutionality of two decisions under 
the Immigration Act: first, that he was a person convicted of a serious criminal 
offence and thus subject to deportation; and second, that he was not eligible to have 
his refugee claim referred to the Refugee Division of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board for determination (the Minister having issued a certificate stating that he 
constituted a danger to the public in Canada). Relying on the Supreme Court’s 
judgment in Chiarelli, Justice Marceau held that the requirement of no serious 
criminal convictions was neither illegitimate nor arbitrary and that the procedure to 
determine whether a non-citizen had breached this requirement did not violate 
fundamental justice and thus complied with s. 7. With regard to whether s. 7 was 
engaged by removal, he concluded that “forcibly deporting an individual against his 
will has the necessary effect of interfering with his liberty, in any meaning that the 
word can bear, in the same manner as extradition was found to interfere in Kindler, 
supra.”66 
 
Justice Marceau held that the decision finding Nguyen ineligible to have his 
refugee claim determined by the Convention Refugee Determination Division did 
not, in itself, engage s. 7 since “contrary to the first decision which entailed forced 
deportation and therefore deprivation of liberty, a declaration of ineligibility does not 
imply or lead, in itself, to any positive act which may affect life, liberty or security of 
the person.”67 However, this did not end the matter. Justice Marceau proceeded to 
examine the constitutionality of the two provisions in the context of the entire 
scheme: 
 
The Supreme Court [in Chiarelli], following in that respect the approach 
of this Court, examined the constitutional challenge as being aimed at the 
scheme viewed as a whole. The removal of the special right to appeal was 
perceived as the removal of a means to oppose the deportation order and, 
as a result, might engage section 7 of the Charter. Similarly in our case, 
while a determination of ineligibility under subparagraph 46.01(1)(e)(ii) of 
the Act is only indirectly linked to the deportation order, nevertheless it 
has the effect of taking away the only possible barrier to the issuance of an 
unconditional deportation order, and as such participates in the deprivation 
of liberty and, possibly, the security of the individual which results from 
                                                 
65 Nguyen v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 1 FCR 696, 100 DLR (4th) 151 
(CA) [Nguyen]. 
 
66 Ibid at para 7, footnote 5. 
 
67 Ibid at 704. 
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deportation. More generally, the deprivation of liberty involved in any 
forced deportation is given a new dimension by the fact that the individual 
to be deported claims to be a refugee. It is appropriate, therefore, to 
assume that section 7 of the Charter is brought into play with respect to 
the scheme as a whole, that is to say with respect not only to the issuance 
of the deportation order, but also to the ineligibility decision based on the 
public danger certificate. The question becomes whether the issuance of 
the public danger certificate, the central feature of the scheme as a whole, 
could be said to have violated a principle of fundamental justice.68 
 
The underlined passages in Justice Marceau’s judgment support the proposition that 
immigration proceedings linked to the deportation of non-citizens engage their s. 7 
liberty interest so long as they make deportation more likely.69 This approach to 
causation, sensitive to the specific statutory context, is consistent with the standard 
recently set by the Supreme Court in Bedford. As will be discussed further, it is, for 
reasons unexplained, no longer followed in the deportation context by the Federal 
Court of Appeal nor, arguably, by the Supreme Court itself.70 
 
In Williams v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),71 a 
permanent resident of Jamaican origin convicted of serious criminal offenses was 
ordered deported. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration issued an opinion 
that Williams constituted a danger to the Canadian public, stripping him of his right 
to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Board. The Federal Court of Appeal considered 
whether this engaged Williams’s liberty or security of the person. Justice Strayer 
acknowledged that the “jurisprudence of this Court on this subject has not been 
entirely consistent”72 and contrasted the line of decisions finding s. 7 engagement 
(Chiarelli and Nguyen) with that finding no engagement (Hoang, Canepa and 
Barrera). He determined that liberty was not engaged: 
 
… I have difficulty understanding how the refusal of a discretionary 
exemption from a lawful deportation order, as applied to a non-refugee 
who has no legal right to be in the country, must be seen as involving a 
deprivation of liberty. Unless “liberty” is taken to include the freedom to 
be anywhere one wishes, regardless of the law, how can it be “deprived” 
by the lawful execution of a removal order? 
… 
                                                 
68 Ibid at para 10 [underlining added]. 
 
69 Nguyen was followed by the Federal Court Trial Division in Kaberuka v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 FCR 252 at 262, 32 Imm LR (2d) 38 (TD) [Kaberuka]. 
 
70 I discuss this point further in section 3, infra. 
 
71 Williams v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 2 FCR 646, 147 DLR (4th) 93 
(CA) [Williams]. 
 
72 Ibid at para 23. 
 UNBLJ   RD UN-B  [VOL/TOME 68 
 
326 
 
On the basis of the jurisprudence to date, then, I am unable to conclude 
that “liberty” includes the right of personal choice for permanent residents 
to stay in this country where, as the Supreme Court said in Chiarelli: 
[t]hey have all deliberately violated an essential 
condition under which they were permitted to remain 
in Canada.73 
 
The Federal Court of Appeal’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chiarelli to conclude that deportation did not engage non-citizens’ liberty – a 
question expressly not considered by the Supreme Court – indicates that it once 
more74 confused this question with the question answered by Chiarelli: whether a 
(presumed) deprivation of non-citizens’ liberty accorded with substantive principles 
of fundamental justice in circumstances where they had violated an essential 
condition under which they could remain in Canada.75  
 
Justice Strayer also dismissed the respondent’s argument that, consistent 
with a broadening understanding of the liberty interest, deportation engaged s. 7 
because it interfered with non-citizens’ personal autonomy over important decisions 
intimately affecting their private lives.76 While he correctly held that this broader 
view of liberty had not yet been accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court, this 
would happen only four years later, in Blencoe. In Romans v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), a case decided shortly after Blencoe, the Federal Court 
Trial Division held that deportation engaged a deportee’s liberty interest in its broad 
sense: 
 
The consequence of the issuance of the deportation order against an 
individual is profound. The deportation order prohibits Mr. Romans from 
making the fundamental personal choice to remain in Canada where he 
receives the love and support of his family, financial support, and the 
support of his social worker and the health-care system. I am satisfied that 
in the circumstances before me the issuance of a deportation order… 
engages section 7 of the Charter.77 
What can be gleaned from a decade of Federal Court decisions on whether 
the deportation of non-citizens engages their liberty interest under s. 7? Decisions of 
                                                 
73 Ibid at paras 24 and 26. 
 
74 As it had in Hoang, Canepa and Barrera, supra notes 59, 60 and 62. 
 
75 The Court of Appeal did not engage with the reasoning in Chiarelli and Nguyen that deportation of non-
citizens necessarily interfered with their liberty, adopted by the Federal Court, Trial Division subsequent 
to Williams in Al Yamani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 FCR 433 at paras 
59 and 61, 5 Imm LR (3d) 235 (TD).  
 
76 The respondent relied on the judgment of LaForest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ in 
B(R), supra note 18. 
 
77 Romans v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 466 at para 22, 14 Imm LR 
(3d) 215 [Romans]. Romans, who had come to Canada at the age of two, was later diagnosed with chronic 
paranoid schizophrenia. Canada sought to remove him on grounds of serious criminality. Relying on 
Chiarelli, the Court found no breach of the principles of fundamental justice, a conclusion upheld by the 
Federal Court of Appeal which accepted, without deciding, that s. 7 was engaged: Romans v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCA 272 at para 1, 17 Imm LR (3d) 34. 
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the Federal Court of Appeal answering this question in the negative were based on a 
misreading of the Chiarelli decision, which did not decide the question of 
engagement. Not one of them provides a principled or compelling answer to the 
observations of Justice Pratte in Chiarelli or of Justice Marceau in Nguyen that 
forcibly deporting an individual against his will necessarily interferes with his 
liberty. Medovarksi offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to address in a 
principled manner the question of s. 7 engagement in the deportation context and 
perhaps, as Justice Dawson had done in Romans, apply to it the expanded conception 
of liberty it had recently adopted in Blencoe. 
 
 
(c) The Supreme Court speaks: Medovarski and Charkaoui 
 
The question of whether liberty and security of the person were engaged by 
proceedings leading to non-citizens’ removal from Canada was squarely before the 
Supreme Court in Medovarksi.78 Medovarksi and Esteban were permanent residents 
who had been ordered deported for serious criminality. They had appealed their 
removal to the Immigration Appeal Division and their removal orders were 
automatically stayed under provisions of the Immigration Act. When the IRPA was 
enacted, their appeals were discontinued under transitional provisions. Medovarksi 
argued that on a proper interpretation of these provisions, her right of appeal should 
have been preserved. In the alternative, she claimed that its discontinuance infringed 
s. 7: 
 
She claims that deportation removes her liberty to make fundamental 
decisions that affect her personal life, including her choice to remain with 
her partner. Medovarski argues her security of the person is infringed by 
the state-imposed psychological stress of being deported. Medovarski 
further alleges that the process by which her appeal was extinguished was 
unfair, contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.79 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada declared that: 
 
The most fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens do 
not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in Canada: Chiarelli … at 
p. 733. Thus the deportation of a non-citizen in itself cannot implicate the 
liberty and security interests protected by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.80 
 
                                                 
78 Charkaoui, supra note 5. 
 
79 Medovarksi, supra note 4 at para 45. The Federal Court of Appeal did not decide whether s. 7 was 
engaged by Medovarksi’s removal from Canada, finding that, based on Chiarelli, the principles of 
fundamental justice were not offended by the discontinuance of her appeal: Medovarksi v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 85 at paras 58–62, [2004] 4 FCR 48. 
 
80 Medovarksi, supra note 4 at para 46. 
 UNBLJ   RD UN-B  [VOL/TOME 68 
 
328 
 
It also held that even if liberty and security of the person were engaged, Medovarksi 
had not established that any unfairness wrought by the transition to IRPA breached 
the principles of fundamental justice.81 According to Chiarelli, fundamental justice 
did not mandate an appeal on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, which 
could, in any event, be considered by the Minister if Medovarksi applied to remain in 
Canada under s. 25(1) of IRPA.82 
 
 In Charkaoui,83 the Supreme Court significantly qualified its holding in 
Medovarksi on the engagement of s. 7.  Adil Charkaoui, a permanent resident, and 
Hassan Almrei and Mohammed Harkat, both foreign nationals recognized as 
Convention refugees, were named in certificates of inadmissibility (“security 
certificates”) issued by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 
and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration under the IRPA. Following the 
issuance of the certificates, which deemed them to be threats to Canada’s national 
security, all three individuals were detained pending the completion of a multistage 
process for their removal.84 First, a Federal Court judge determined whether the 
certificate was reasonable in proceedings conducted, at the Ministers’ request, in 
camera and ex parte.85 A certificate determined to be reasonable became a removal 
order. Second, the named person could apply to the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration for a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA), which would consider 
whether removal would subject him to a danger of torture or to a risk to his life or of 
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, and whether his claim for protection 
should be refused because of the nature and severity of acts he had committed or 
because of the danger he constituted to the security of Canada.86 A successful PRRA 
application would result in a stay of the removal order. 
 
Charkaoui, Almrei and Harkat challenged the constitutionality of the 
procedure for determining the reasonableness of the certificate, claiming, inter alia, 
that it infringed their rights to life, liberty and security of the person under s. 7 of the 
Charter. The Court observed that the claimants were required to prove two matters: 
 
[F]irst, that there has been or could be a deprivation of the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person, and second, that the deprivation was not 
or would not be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.87 
                                                 
81 Ibid at para 47. 
 
82 A humanitarian and compassionate application to the Minister had also been available to Chiarelli under 
the Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c I-2, s 114(2). 
 
83 Charkoui, supra note 5. 
 
84 The IRPA provided that upon issuance of a certificate, permanent residents may be held in detention but 
that foreign nationals must be detained: Charkaoui, supra note 5 at para 6. 
 
85 The Ministers and the designated judge could rely on undisclosed material that neither the person named 
in the certificate nor their counsel could see. The judge disclosed to the named person a summary of the 
case against him but could not disclose information that might compromise national security.  
 
86 IRPA, supra note 25 at ss 113(d) and 97. 
 
87 Charkaoui, supra note 5 at para 12 [underlining added]. 
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The Court’s use of “could be” or “would be” signals that a successful s. 7 claim does 
not require that the claimant actually be detained or subjected to treatment causing 
psychological or physical suffering; the risk of such treatment is enough. Indeed, the 
Court determined that the security certificate provisions “clearly deprive detainees 
such as the appellants of their liberty,” noting that “the person named in a security 
certificate can face detention pending the outcome of the proceeding,”88 and that 
detention was automatic for foreign nationals. In other words, while the deprivation 
of liberty in Charkaoui was clear because the named persons were actually detained, 
the possibility of detention also engaged the liberty interest. Rejecting the Attorney 
General’s claim that Medovarksi excluded the application of s. 7 to removal 
proceedings, the Court stated that “[w]hile the deportation of a non-citizen in the 
immigration context may not in itself engage s. 7 of the Charter, some features 
associated with deportation, such as detention in the course of the certificate process 
or the prospect of deportation to torture, may do so.”89 
 
Professor Hamish Stewart has observed that the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decisions in Charkaoui and Medovarksi are in tension on the question of whether s. 7 
is engaged in proceedings leading to removal from Canada: 
 
Criminal proceedings, and most other penal proceedings as well, have to 
comply with section 7 from the outset because of the potential for 
imprisonment that they create … Because of the holding in Medovarksi, 
this logic apparently does not apply to deportation proceedings; thus, in 
Poshteh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Federal 
Court of Appeal held that the initial steps in proceedings that may lead to 
deportation, such as a finding that a person is inadmissible to Canada, do 
not engage section 7 because those initial steps do not necessarily mean 
that individual will ever be detained. But because of the holding in 
Charkaoui, there must be some point in the proceedings where the 
likelihood of detention incidental to deportation is sufficiently high that 
the liberty interest is engaged and section 7 applies.90 
 
Another possibility, of course, is that the tension between Medovarksi and Charkaoui 
cannot be resolved and that Medovarksi should be reconsidered, a question I examine 
in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
88 Ibid at para 13 [underlining added]. 
 
89 Ibid at para 17. 
 
90 Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 81. 
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(d) Liberty and immigration and refugee proceedings: an appraisal of the case 
law 
 
Medovarksi squarely raised a question that had long been contested in the Federal 
Court of Appeal: whether deportation in itself can implicate s. 7 interests. The 
Supreme Court’s decision that it could not, based entirely on its assertion of non-
citizens’ qualified right to enter or remain in Canada – a principle mobilized in 
Chiarelli to narrow the content of fundamental justice in the immigration context – 
was perplexing. Professors Donald Galloway and Jamie Liew saw in this passage 
from Medovarksi “a remarkable extrapolation… based on the failure to distinguish 
between, on the one hand, not interfering with a right to liberty and security, and, on 
the other hand, interfering with the right but doing so in a manner that accords with 
the principles of fundamental justice,” a distinction expressly drawn by the Court in 
Chiarelli but “glossed over” in Medovarski.91  
 
Rather than confusing the question of s. 7 engagement and that of 
compliance with fundamental justice, the Supreme Court may, in referring to the 
qualified rights of non-citizens, have intended to imply that because s. 6 of the 
Charter confers exclusively on citizens the constitutional right to enter, remain in 
and leave Canada, the deportation of a non-citizen would not violate s. 6. However, 
the fact that the deportation of non-citizens does not violate their mobility rights does 
not mean that it cannot engage other Charter rights.92 The Supreme Court correctly 
rejected a similar claim in the extradition context, holding that the fact that the 
breach of extraditees’ s. 6 rights was generally justifiable did not insulate the 
extradition process from scrutiny for violation of other Charter rights, including s. 
7.93 It could not seriously be argued, for example, that a law aimed at prioritizing for 
                                                 
91 Donald Galloway & Jamie Chai Yun Liew, Immigration Law, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) at 656. 
 
92 Ibid at 80. 
 
93 See R v Schmidt, [1987] 1 SCR 500, 39 DLR (4th) 18. Schmidt was facing extradition to the United 
States to face a state charge of child stealing after having been acquitted of a federal charge of kidnapping. 
She argued that her extradition would violate her right, under s. 11(h) of the Charter, not to be tried again 
for an offence of which she had been finally acquitted. Noting that the Ontario Court of Appeal, in 
Federal Republic of Germany v Rauca (1983), 38 OR (2d) 225, 145 DLR (3d) 638 (CA) had determined 
that extradition was a reasonable infringement on the right of Canadian citizens, under s. 6 of the Charter, 
to remain in Canada, the Ontario High Court of Justice had decided that any argument that specific aspects 
of extradition were contrary to other Charter rights, including those guaranteed by ss. 11(h) and 7, was 
ruled out: R v Schmidt (1983), 41 OR (2d) 399 at 407, 147 DLR (2d) 616. Justice La Forest, for a majority 
of the Supreme Court, disagreed with this conclusion: 
… I am far from thinking that the Charter has no application to extradition. The surrender 
of a person to a foreign country may obviously affect a number of Charter rights. In 
Rauca, supra, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that extradition 
intruded on a citizen’s right under s. 6 to remain in Canada, although it also found that the 
beneficial aspects of the procedure in preventing malefactors from evading justice, a 
procedure widely adopted all over the world, were sufficient to sustain it as a reasonable 
limit under s. 1 of the Charter. Section 6 was not raised in this case, though Schmidt is a 
Canadian citizen, no doubt because her counsel believed, as I do, that it was properly 
disposed of in the Rauca case. However, it does not follow from the fact that the 
procedure is generally justifiable that the manner in which the procedures are conducted in 
Canada and the conditions under which a fugitive is surrendered can never invite Charter 
scrutiny. The pre-eminence of the Constitution must be recognized; the treaty, the 
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removal non-citizens of African origin would not engage and violate their equality 
rights under s. 15.94 Why, then, should non-citizens be precluded from asserting that 
their forced removal from Canada subjects them to possible detention or would 
deprive them of the opportunity to parent and care for their children, a fundamental 
choice recognized by several Supreme Court judges as an aspect of liberty under s. 7, 
or interfere with another similarly fundamental choice? Lacking in Medovarski, as 
Professor Stewart notes, is “a more careful analysis of the nature and effect of 
deportation on a person present in Canada.”95 Equally absent is any analysis of 
whether non-citizens’ physical liberty is engaged by the possibility of detention 
incidental to removal, an argument considered by the Federal Court of Appeal in its 
earlier decisions. As Professor Stewart points out, deportation engages the liberty 
interest “because a deportation order includes the possibility of detaining the 
deportee in order to carry it out, just as penal proceedings engage the liberty interest 
because a finding of guilt includes possibility of imprisonment as punishment.”96 
While not giving non-citizens “an unqualified right to enter or remain in Canada,” 
this solution would “require the legal rules governing deportation from Canada to 
comply with the principles of fundamental justice,” an appropriate requirement 
“given the importance to a permanent resident or Convention refugee of remaining in 
Canada.”97 
 
Indeed, under the IRPA, an officer may, without warrant, arrest and detain a 
foreign national, other than a protected person, who the officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe is inadmissible and is a danger to the public or is unlikely to 
appear for removal from Canada or other proceeding that could lead to the making of 
a removal order by the Minister under ss. 44(2).98 The IRPA establishes a regime that 
places non-citizens under the administrative control of the state99 in large measure 
through the threat of their forced removal from Canada. As part of the process set up 
to achieve this end, the enforcement provisions of IRPA establish a statutory 
                                                                                                                   
extradition hearing in this country and the exercise of the executive discretion to surrender 
a fugitive must all conform to the requirements of the Charter, including the principles of 
fundamental justice. [Underlining added]. 
See also F Pearl Eliadis, “The Swing from Singh: The Narrowing Application of the Charter in 
Immigration Law” (1995) 26 Imm LR (2d) 130 at 142. 
 
94 See, for example, YZ v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 892, 387 DLR (4th) 
676, where the Federal Court determined that a provision of IRPA that denied refugee claimants from 
designated countries of origin access to an appeal before the Refugee Appeal Division violated s. 15(1) of 
the Charter. 
 
95 Stewart, supra note 90 at 80. 
 
96 Ibid. 
 
97 Ibid. 
 
98 IRPA, supra note 25, s 55(2). Permanent residents or foreign nationals may also be arrested and 
detained pursuant to a warrant on the same grounds: s 55(1).  
 
99 Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (AG), 2014 FC 651, 28 Imm LR (4th) 1 [Canadian 
Doctors for Refugee Care].  
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compulsion on non-citizens to appear at a specific time and place subject to legal 
consequences, including arrest and detention, with or without a warrant depending 
on the circumstances. Just as this kind of statutory compulsion triggered the liberty 
interest in the Beare and Thomson judgments,100 the potential of detention incidental 
to removal and to proceedings that could lead to removal should suffice to engage 
non-citizens’ right to liberty under s. 7, an outcome hinted at, as noted above, in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Charkaoui.  
 
Contrasting the scope of application of s. 7 in immigration and refugee 
protection proceedings to the extradition and penal contexts is instructive. In Canada, 
extradition proceedings begin when a foreign state requests that Canada surrender a 
person to be prosecuted or to serve a sentence for extraditable conduct.101 The 
proceedings that follow involve several steps. First, the Minister of Justice issues an 
“authority to proceed” authorizing the Attorney General to seek a court order for the 
committal of the extraditee if satisfied that the conditions for extradition are met in 
respect of one or more offenses mentioned in the request.102 The Attorney General 
may then apply for the issuance of a summons to the extraditee or a warrant for that 
person’s arrest.103 At the judicial phase of the extradition process, an extradition 
hearing before a superior court judge, the extradition judge must decide whether 
there is “evidence… of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify 
committal for trial in Canada on the offense set out in the authority to proceed” and, 
if so, order the committal of the person into custody to await surrender.104 In the 
ministerial phase following committal, the Minister of Justice must decide whether 
to surrender the person to the requesting state105 and make surrender conditional on 
assurances from the requesting state.106 
 
The Supreme Court has stated that “section 7 permeates the entire 
extradition process” and is engaged at both the stages of committal and surrender.107 
At the committal stage, s. 7 requires the extradition judge to ensure “that the 
committal order, if it is to issue, is the product of a fair judicial process.”108 The 
liberty interest is engaged because “the person sought may be detained while an 
extradition request is dealt with, and will certainly be detained if that request is 
                                                 
100 Beare, supra note 28 and Thomson, supra note 29. 
 
101 Extradition Act, SC 1999, c 18, ss 2 and 3. Requests are usually made pursuant to an extradition treaty. 
 
102 Ibid at s 15. 
 
103 Ibid at s 16. 
 
104 Ibid at s 29(1). 
 
105 The reasons for which the Minister may refuse to surrender the extraditee are listed in ss. 44 to 47 of 
the Extradition Act, ibid. 
 
106 Ibid at s 58(f). 
 
107 United States of America v Cobb, 2001 SCC 19 at para 34, [2001] 1 SCR 587 [emphasis added].  
 
108 Ibid. 
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granted.”109 Indeed, even the very first step of the process, the issuance by the 
Minister of an authority to proceed, is subject to s. 7. Issuance of an authority to 
proceed in circumstances disclosing bad faith or improper motives or where the 
authority to proceed provides the person sought with inadequate notice of the case he 
or she faces will violate the principles of fundamental justice, breach s. 7 and justify 
the quashing of the authority to proceed under s. 24(1) of the Charter.110 
 
Similarly, in penal proceedings, it is the possibility of detention and 
imprisonment as an outcome of the proceedings which justifies the application of s. 7 
from their outset. As Professor Stewart notes, “it would be odd if the principles of 
fundamental justice came into play only at the point where the accused had been 
convicted and the judge had decided to imprison him, or if the content of the 
applicable principles was different depending on whether the Crown announced its 
intention to seek a term of imprisonment before the trial began.”111 The Supreme 
Court’s approach ensures that “the principles of fundamental justice will always 
apply in penal proceedings, whether or not imprisonment, another form of detention, 
or probation will ultimately be imposed.”112 
 
That the risk of immigration detention may be lower than the risk of 
imprisonment in penal proceedings should not defeat the claim that the liberty 
interest is engaged by proceedings under the IRPA. A majority of the Supreme Court 
found that the availability of imprisonment for the offence of simple possession of 
marijuana was sufficient to trigger s. 7 scrutiny113 despite the fact that imprisonment 
was only imposed by the Courts in exceptional circumstances.114 The exceptional 
nature of imprisonment and the relatively short sentences associated with conviction 
spoke not to the engagement of s. 7, which flowed from the availability of 
imprisonment, but to whether this availability breached any principles of 
fundamental justice – in particular, the principle against gross disproportionality.115 
 
An approach to the engagement of the liberty interest in immigration and 
refugee proceedings which, consistent with that adopted by the Court in the context 
of extradition and penal proceedings, recognizes that liberty is engaged from the 
outset of the proceedings given the possibility of detention incidental to deportation 
                                                 
109 Stewart, supra note 90 at 71 [emphasis added]. See also United States of America v Ferras; United 
States of America v Latty, 2006 SCC 33 at para 49, [2006] 2 SCR 77.  
 
110 Froom v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2005 FCA 352 at paras 18–19, [2005] 2 FCR 19; United States 
of America v Saas, (2004) 237 DLR (4th) 623, 61 WCB (2d) 325 (ONCA).  
 
111 Stewart, supra note 90 at 69. 
 
112 Ibid. 
 
113 R v Malmo-Levine; R v Caine, 2003 SCC 74 at paras 84, 89, [2003] 3 SCR 571.  
 
114 Ibid at para 154. 
 
115 Ibid at paras 158–161. 
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seems particularly apt considering the growing convergence and overlap between 
criminal law and immigration law known as “crimmigration.”116 A hallmark of this 
convergence has been that “immigration enforcement measures – particularly 
detention and deportation – are used much more commonly in response to suspected 
criminal activity than ever before.”117 Writing on the longstanding characterization 
of deportation by American courts as a civil rather than criminal or penal proceeding 
and thus subject to a dramatically lower level of constitutional scrutiny, Kanstroom 
has argued that the “increasing real world convergence” between the United States’ 
criminal justice and deportation systems “compels a rethinking of the foundational 
principles underlying the constitutional status of deportation.”118 Since the 
deportation of long-term permanent residents for post-entry criminal conduct serves 
an incapacitating function to the deported, a deterrent function to others and could be 
understood as a form of retribution – justifications accepted as part of criminal law – 
one might assume, Kanstroom observes, that persons subject to these types of 
proceedings “would at least have the most basic constitutional rights accorded to 
criminal defendants,” an assumption supported by the fact that deportation 
proceedings are “initiated by a government agency, are directly based on criminal 
conduct, involve incarceration and forced movement of persons, and may result in 
lifetime banishment.”119  
 
Legislative developments in Canada too have seen a marked erosion of the 
statutory protections afforded to permanent residents against deportation on grounds 
of serious criminality.120 These legislative efforts culminated in the enactment of the 
Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act,121 which subjected permanent residents 
sentenced in Canada to more than six months imprisonment (including conditional 
sentence orders) to automatic removal with no IAD review of the circumstances of 
their case and removed the ability of the Minister to consider humanitarian and 
compassionate factors against removal for permanent residents inadmissible on 
grounds of organized criminality.122 Parliament has thus made deportation the 
automatic consequence of receiving a sentence over six months on conviction of one 
                                                 
116 Sharryn Aiken, David Lyon & Malcolm Thorburn, “Criminalization, Surveillance and ‘Security 
Threats’: A Multidisciplinary Dialogue” (2014) 40:1 Queen’s LJ i–xi; Juliet Stumpf, “The Crimmigration 
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power” (2006) 56 Am U L Rev 367. See also Katja Franko Aas 
& Mary Bosworth, “Preface” in Katja Franko Aas & Mary Bosworth, eds, The Borders of Punishment: 
Migration, Citizenship and Social Exclusion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at vii. 
 
117 Aiken, Lyon & Thorburn, supra note 116 at ii.  
 
118 Daniel Kanstroom, “Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard 
Laws Make Bad Cases” (2000) 113 Harv L Rev 1889 at 1892. 
 
119 Ibid at 1894. 
 
120 Canadian Bar Association, Citizenship and Immigration Law Section, Submission on Bill C-31 – 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (May 2002), online: CBA <www.cba.org/Sections/ Immigration-
Law/Submissions-and-Legislative-Updates> at 51–59. 
 
121 An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2013, c 16. 
 
122 Canadian Bar Association, National Immigration Law Section, Bill C-43, Faster Removal of Foreign 
Criminals Act (November 2012), online: CBA <www.cba.org/Sections/ Immigration-Law/Submissions-
and-Legislative-Updates> at 7–12. 
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of a broad range of criminal offences. Catherine Dauvergne observes that the 
imposition of eligibility provisions based on criminality as a precondition of access 
to domestic asylum processes is an example of the “criminalization of asylum 
seeking.”123 In light of Kanstroom’s criticisms of the American constitutional 
jurisprudence on deportation, the emergence of crimmigration in Canada highlights 
the weaknesses of an approach to the engagement of constitutional protections that 
would hinge on whether deportation should be labelled as a “penal,” “criminal,” 
“civil” or “immigration” proceeding. The Supreme Court appeared to have 
recognized this in Charkaoui when it dismissed the claim that Medovarksi stood for 
the proposition that deportation proceedings were immune from s. 7 scrutiny: 
 
In determining whether s. 7 applies, we must look at the interests at stake 
rather than the legal label attached to the impugned legislation. As 
Professor Hamish Stewart writes:  
Many of the principles of fundamental justice were 
developed in criminal cases, but their application is not 
restricted to criminal cases: they apply whenever one 
of the three protected interests is engaged. Put another 
way, the principles of fundamental justice apply in 
criminal proceedings, not because they are criminal 
proceedings, but because the liberty interest is always 
engaged in criminal proceedings. [Emphasis in 
original.]124 
 
In addition to engaging non-citizens’ liberty interest, narrowly defined as 
including freedom from the threat of detention incidental to deportation, deportation 
decisions also arguably engage liberty broadly defined in Blencoe as protecting 
important and fundamental life choices. The Supreme Court has on several occasions 
come close to recognizing that “the right to nurture a child, to care for its 
development and to make decisions for it in fundamental matters… are part of the 
liberty interest of a parent.”125 Justice Wilson, who first accepted this proposition, 
described the parental liberty interest as an aspect of the right to respect for an 
individual’s private and family life protected at international law: 
 
[The appellant] has the right, I believe, to raise his children in accordance 
with his conscientious beliefs. The relations of affection between an 
individual and his family and his assumption of duties and responsibilities 
towards them are central to the individual’s sense of self and of his place 
                                                 
123 Catherine Dauvergne, “The Troublesome Intersections of Refugee Law and Criminal Law” in Katja 
Franko Aas & Mary Bosworth, eds, The Borders of Punishment: Migration, Citizenship and Social 
Exclusion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 76 at 76. 
 
124 Charkaoui, supra note 5 at para 18, citing Hamish Stewart, “Is Indefinite Detention of Terrorist 
Suspects Really Constitutional?” (2005) 54 UNBLJ 235 at 242 
 
125 B(R), supra note 18 at para 83 per La Forest, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ; G(J), supra note 14 per 
L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ; and Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 36, 2002 
SCC 86 at para 87, [2002] 4 SCR 710 per Gonthier and Bastarache JJ. 
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in the world. The right to educate his children is one facet of this larger 
concept. This has been widely recognized. Article 8(1) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms… states in part “Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life...”126 
 
Under this approach, liberty is engaged where deportation would interfere with a 
non-citizen’s ability to nurture and care for his or her children. Section 7 would be 
breached in such circumstances if deportation violated fundamental justice by 
causing a deprivation of liberty grossly disproportionate to the state’s objective in 
pursuing removal.127 
 
 The framework set down by the Supreme Court in Blencoe to determine 
whether the liberty interest is engaged requires an analysis of whether “in the 
circumstances of this case,” the state has prevented the rights claimant from making 
any fundamental personal choices – basic choices going to the core of what it means 
to enjoy individual dignity and independence. No such analysis appears in the 
Court’s decision in Medovarksi.128 Instead, the Court invoked non-citizens’ lack of 
an “unqualified right to enter or remain in Canada” to defeat the s. 7 claim. But 
under the Blencoe framework, this argument would only suffice in circumstances 
where a non-citizen’s liberty claim could be reduced to the bare assertion of a 
mobility right – the right to enter Canada freely and remain there as if the 
international border did not exist – as the expression of the core of his or her 
individual dignity and independence. It is not an answer to non-citizens’ assertion of 
fundamental interests that go beyond mobility. 
 
                                                 
126 R v Jones, [1986] 2 SCR 284 at 319, 47 Alta LR (2d) 97.  
 
127 See Bedford, supra note 34 at para 120: a law or state action violates fundamental justice where its 
“effects on life, liberty or security of the person are so grossly disproportionate to its purposes that they 
cannot rationally be supported.” The requirement that deportation be proportionate to a legitimate state 
objective is an integral part of the jurisprudence under art 8 of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 222 (1950) which guarantees the right to 
respect of one’s private and family life. While recognizing the power of European states to control the  
entry of aliens into their territories and their residence there, the European Court of Human Rights has 
held that in some circumstances, the expulsion of an alien will violate art. 8: Üner v The Netherlands (18 
Oct. 2006), no. 46410/99 (European Court of Human Rights) at para 57, online 
(http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?=001-77542). A deportation decision that interferes with family life will be 
found to violate art. 8 if it is not “in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society, that is 
to say, justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”: 
ibid, at para 54. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the treaty 
body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 7 March 1966, 660 UNTS 195, Can TS 1970 No 28 (entered into 
force 4 January 1969, ratified by Canada 14 October 1970) recommends that state parties avoid expulsions 
of non-citizens, especially of long-term residents, that would result in disproportionate interference with 
the right to family life: CERD, General Recommendation 30: Discrimination Against Non Citizens, 64th 
sess, 2004, UN Doc CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004). 
 
128 One could infer from the Court’s statement that deportation “in itself” does not engage s. 7 that the 
circumstances of Medovarksi’s case disclosed no fundamental personal choices that could ground a liberty 
claim. If this inference is correct, the Court should have made an express finding to that effect. 
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 The jurisprudence on whether immigration and refugee protection 
proceedings engage the liberty of non-citizens, including the Supreme Court’s 
sweeping conclusion in Medovarksi that deportation does not, in itself, implicate 
liberty is unsatisfactory because it fails to transparently address two key arguments 
that strongly support the engagement of non-citizens’ liberty in this context. First, 
liberty is engaged by the possibility of detention incidental to removal – a claim 
based on an analogy to penal and extradition proceedings that is particularly apt in a 
context where immigration enforcement is commonly used as a response to criminal 
activity. Second, deportation engages non-citizens’ liberty by preventing them from 
making fundamental personal choices beyond the bare assertion of a mobility right. 
In Charkaoui, the Supreme Court may have addressed this latter point by qualifying 
its holding in Medovarksi to allow for the engagement of s. 7 by some “features 
associated with deportation,” thereby “leaving the door open” for advocates to 
persuade immigration decision makers and courts that s. 7 is engaged by the 
hardships that accompany deportation, including separation from family.129 As the 
following section demonstrates, clarification is also sorely needed on whether 
immigration and refugee protection proceedings engage non-citizens’ security of the 
person and, particularly, on whether the right to security of the person is a 
freestanding constitutional right that does not hinge on non-citizens’ statutory 
entitlements. 
 
 
2. Security of the person 
 
The seminal decision on whether security of the person is engaged in the 
immigration and refugee protection context remains Singh v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration).130 Under the procedure in place under the 
Immigration Act, 1976, Singh’s claim that he was a Convention refugee could be 
denied by a decision maker who had not heard his claim in person on the basis of 
country conditions information to which he was not given access. Singh claimed that 
this statutory scheme infringed s. 7 of the Charter and advanced two arguments in 
support of its engagement. First, he claimed that “because a Convention refugee is, 
by definition, a person who has a “well-founded fear of persecution”, the refusal to 
give him refuge exposes him to jeopardy of death, significant diminution of his 
physical liberty or physical punishment in his country of origin.”131 Second, he 
claimed that by empowering immigration officials to detain him for purposes of 
examination and removal, the Immigration Act deprived him of his liberty. 
 
Justice Wilson began her analysis of whether the appellant had been 
deprived of life, liberty and security of the person by first “determining what rights 
                                                 
129 Galloway & Liew, supra note 91 at 656. 
 
130 Singh, supra note 2. 
 
131 Ibid at 203. 
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the appellants have under the Immigration Act, 1976”132 –  namely, the right to a 
determination from the Minister as to whether a permit should issue entitling him to 
enter and remain in Canada, the right not to be returned to a country where his life or 
freedom would be threatened and the right to appeal a removal order or a deportation 
order made against him – and second, by asking “whether the deprivation of these 
rights constitutes a deprivation of the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person…”133 While she acknowledged that there might be some merit in the 
Minister’s submission that “closing off the avenues of escape provided by the Act 
[did] not per se deprive a Convention refugee of the right to life or to liberty,” 
because it was not certain that others would deprive him of life or liberty,134 this was 
not the case for his right to security of the person, which “must encompass freedom 
from the threat of physical punishment or suffering as well as freedom from such 
punishment itself”: 
 
I note particularly that a Convention refugee has the right under s. 55 of 
the Act not to “… be removed from Canada to a country where his life or 
freedom would be threatened…” In my view, the denial of such a right 
must amount to a deprivation of security of the person within the meaning 
of s. 7.135 
 
Justice Wilson also recognized that, as refugee claimants, the appellants were not “at 
this stage entitled to certain rights as Convention refugees” but instead asserted they 
were entitled to fundamental justice in the determination of whether they were 
Convention refugees or not.136 Noting that a determination that the appellants were 
Convention refugees under the Act would have entitled them to the incidents of that 
status provided for in the Act (including the right not to be refouled), Justice Wilson 
concluded: 
 
Given the potential consequences for the appellants of a denial of that 
status if they are in fact persons with a “well-founded fear of persecution”, 
it seems to me unthinkable that the Charter would not apply to entitle 
them to fundamental justice in the adjudication of their status.137 
 
It is noteworthy that in the underlined portion of the extract from her 
judgment, above, Justice Wilson deliberately tied her analysis of whether s. 7 
interests were engaged to whether the appellants had been deprived of rights under 
the Immigration Act, 1976. A possible explanation for doing so is found in her 
reasons for rejecting the Minister’s invitation to adopt the approach taken by 
                                                 
132 Ibid at 204. 
 
133 Ibid. 
 
134 Ibid at 206. As will be discussed in more detail in section 3 of this part, below, the Minister’s 
submission in this regard is inconsistent with the modern standard of causation adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Bedford, supra note 34. 
 
135 Ibid at 207 [underlining added]. 
 
136 Ibid at 208. 
 
137 Ibid at 210. 
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American courts to the constitutional protection of non-citizens in immigration 
proceedings. In her view, an approach denying constitutional due process protections 
to aliens seeking entry on the ground that the power to expel or exclude them was a 
“fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political 
departments largely immune from judicial control”138 (a manifestation of the political 
questions doctrine) should not govern the application of s. 7 because: 
 
[I]n the Canadian context Parliament has in the Immigration Act, 
1976 made many of the “political” determinations which American 
courts have been justifiably reluctant to attempt to get involved in 
themselves. On these appeals this Court is being asked by the 
appellants to accept that the substantive rights of the Convention 
refugees have been determined by the Immigration Act, 1976 itself 
and the Court need concern itself only with the question whether 
the procedural scheme set up by the Act for the determination of 
that status is consistent with the requirements of fundamental 
justice articulated in s. 7 of the Charter.139 
 
Justice Wilson may have tied the deprivation of Charter rights to a deprivation of 
statutory rights in order to pre-emptively defend against claims that by applying 
constitutional due process norms to the political branches’ treatment of non-citizens, 
the Supreme Court was treading in an area of decision-making reserved to these 
branches. This approach relieved the Court of the need to recognize that rights to 
life, liberty and security of the person sprang from the Charter alone; it could find 
support for its decision in the fact that Parliament itself had elected to recognize 
substantive rights arising from the recognition of Convention refugee status. 
 
The importance placed by Justice Wilson on Singh’s rights under the 
Immigration Act, 1976 raised “very important questions about the extent to which s. 
7 procedural claims are founded on the existence of statutory substantive rights as 
opposed to independent or free-standing constitutional rights.”140 Indeed, this issue 
was recently raised by the Federal Court of Appeal in Savunthararasa.141 The 
appellants’ claims to refugee protection were denied by the Refugee Protection 
Division (RPD) because they had failed to demonstrate that if returned to Sri Lanka, 
they would face a serious possibility of persecution. The appellants were scheduled 
to be removed from Canada. Because less than twelve months had passed since their 
claim for refugee protection was last rejected, they were barred from applying for a 
pre-removal risk assessment under s. 112(2)(b.1) of the IRPA. Claiming that new 
                                                 
138 Ibid at 211, citing Shaugnessy v US ex rel Mezei, 345 US 206 (1953) at 210. 
 
139 Ibid at 212.  
 
140 David J Mullan, Administrative Law – Cases, Text and Materials, 5th ed (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 2003) at 229.  
 
141 Savunthararasa, supra note 8. 
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evidence of risk was available that had not been put in evidence before the RPD, 
they requested that their removal be deferred pending an assessment of the risks in 
light of the new evidence. When their requests were denied by enforcement officers 
of the Canada Border Services Agency, they sought judicial review of these 
decisions on the grounds that s. 112(2)(b.1) and the removals process violated their s. 
7 rights: 
 
In the appellants’ submission, section 7 of the Charter is engaged when a 
person claims he would be at “risk of harm” if removed from Canada. 
Further, the “risk of harm” which engages section 7 is broad enough to 
encompass the kinds of risks assessed under both section 96 of the Act (a 
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion) and section 
97 of the Act (a risk of torture or a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment). The appellants argue that enforcement officers 
do not, and are not permitted to, assess this full spectrum of risk.142 
 
At the Federal Court, Justice Annis dismissed the applications. He 
determined that the appellants had not presented evidence of risks they faced that 
could not be assessed by an enforcement officer. Moreover, in a lengthy Charter 
analysis, he determined that s. 112(2)(b.1) was constitutional. The Federal Court of 
Appeal agreed with the appellants that Justice Annis had erred in embarking on the 
Charter analysis without a proper evidentiary record and held that his comments and 
analysis on that issue were obiter dicta. However, it provided guidance on the nature 
of the analysis that would be required to deal with the Charter issue, assuming that 
an applicant for deferral could show that he or she faced a risk of harm that would 
not be assessed by an enforcement officer: 
 
In Singh …, in order to decide whether the appellants had been deprived of 
the right to life, liberty or security of the person, the Court began by 
determining which rights the appellants possessed under the applicable 
immigration legislation. … 
Once the rights possessed by the appellants as refugee claimants were 
identified, the inquiry turned to whether the deprivation of those rights 
constituted a deprivation of the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person within the meaning of section 7 of the Charter. The Court concluded 
that security of the person encompassed “freedom from the threat of 
physical punishment or suffering as well as freedom from such punishment 
itself”… The Court expressly left open the question of whether a more 
expansive approach to security of the person should be taken… 
Because the Court left this question open, in the context of a claim asserting 
a broader concept of security of the person, the Federal Court must be 
mindful of the need to properly analyze at the first stage of the section 7 
analysis whether the removals scheme imposes limits on the security of the 
person, thus engaging section 7 of the Charter.143 
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143 Ibid at paras 27–29. 
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Savunthararasa confirms that the Federal Court of Appeal remains mindful 
that Singh tied the deprivation of security of the person under s. 7 to the deprivation 
of rights conferred under the Immigration Act, 1976. Indeed, it had previously 
distinguished Singh on this basis.144 For example, in Berrahma v Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Citizenship),145 it considered the constitutionality of a provision 
whereby a refugee claimant was ineligible to have a refugee claim referred to the 
Refugee Division because he had filed the claim less than ninety days after first 
having been denied refugee status. The Court held that security of the person was not 
engaged and distinguished Singh as follows: 
 
As I understand it, the reason the Supreme Court concluded as it did in 
Singh is that, to give effect to international obligations assumed earlier, 
Parliament had recognized and granted foreign nationals the right to claim 
refugee status, but failed at the same time to create along with the exercise 
of this right - a right connected with the protection of life and security - a 
procedure consistent with the requirements of fundamental justice. That, I 
think, is the difference between Singh and the case of an ineligible 
claimant: Singh was denied a status which the law gave him the right to 
claim without having any opportunity of showing that he met the 
conditions for obtaining it, whereas the ineligible claimant is not denied a 
status he is entitled to claim.146 
 
The very idea that finding a deprivation of life, liberty or security of the 
person should hinge on proof of the existence of a right or status conferred by statute 
is plainly inconsistent with Justice Wilson’s criticism, in Singh,147 of the dichotomy 
between “rights” and “privileges” which had narrowed the scope of the application 
of the Canadian Bill of Rights.148 A majority of the Supreme Court had held in 
Mitchell v The Queen that s. 2(e) of the Bill of Rights, which provided that “no law of 
Canada shall be construed or applied so as to deprive a person of the right to a fair 
hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the 
determination of his rights and obligations” did not apply to the decision of the 
Parole Board to revoke an individual’s parole because he “had no right to parole.” 
Rather, parole was granted “as a matter of discretion” and subject to revocation at the 
Board’s “absolute discretion.”149 This approach was consistent with the Court’s view 
                                                 
144 See Sharry J Aiken et al, Immigration and Refugee Law – Cases, Materials and Commentary, 2d ed 
(Toronto: Emond, 2015) at 242. 
 
145 Berrahma c Canada (Ministre de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration) (1991), 132 NR 202, 25 ACWS (3d) 
925 (FCA) (WL Can) [Berrahma]. 
 
146 Ibid at para 12. See Nguyen, supra note 65 at para 9, insisting on the fact that Singh did not assist 
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granted.” See also Williams, supra note 71 at para 22. 
 
147 Singh, supra note 2 at 209. 
 
148 Galloway & Liew, supra note 91 at 652. 
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that parole revocation decisions did not attract procedural protections at common 
law; statutorily defined as being at the discretion of the Board, they could not be said 
to affect rights and were therefore not “judicial” in character.150  In a spirited dissent, 
Laskin C.J. attacked this failure to recognize the right of parolees to minimum 
procedural safeguards in parole revocation under the common law and the Bill of 
Rights. In his view, the application of the rules of natural justice should be 
determined not by the judicial character of the decision maker but by “the 
substantive issue that a tribunal is called upon to determine, and its consequences for 
the affected person, whether in respect of his person, his status or his property…”151 
Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Morrisey v Brewer152 that 
“there was more in parole than mere privilege that could be granted or withdrawn at 
the pleasure of the state,” he emphasized the serious consequences of revocation for 
a parolee, including prolonged imprisonment, “loss of job,… loss of conditional 
liberty, loss of family and other association,” and concluded that parole revocation 
without minimum procedural safeguards breached ss. 2(c)(i) and 2(e) of the Bill of 
Rights. To Justice Wilson, an analysis based on the distinction between rights and 
privileges was not acceptable in relation to the Charter.153 She preferred Chief 
Justice Laskin’s dissenting opinion which focused instead “on the consequences of 
parole revocation for the individual.”154 In other words, engagement of s. 7 should 
hinge on the consequences of the impugned state act on the life, liberty and security 
of the person interests of the individual, not on whether that act can be categorized as 
involving the determination of a statutory right rather than the discretionary 
revocation of a privilege. 
 
The judgment in Singh of Beetz, Estey and McIntyre JJ., based on s. 2(e) of 
the Bill of Rights, relies on the rights-privilege distinction. Having laid out the “list 
of legal rights given to Convention refugees in Canada by the Immigration Act, 1976 
and Regulations,”155 counsel for the appellants claimed that the regime set out in the 
Act under which a person could claim Convention refugee status provided for a 
procedure “for the determination of his rights” in the meaning of s. 2(e) of the Bill of 
                                                                                                                   
149 Mitchell v The Queen, [1976] 2 SCR 570 at 588, 61 DLR (3d) 77 [Mitchell], cited by Justice Wilson in 
Singh, ibid at 209. 
 
150 A “judicial decision” was a decision that had a conclusive effect, was adjudicative and had a serious 
adverse effect on rights: Howarth v Canada (National Parole Board), [1976] 1 SCR 453 at 465, 50 DLR 
(3d) 349 per Dickson J. 
 
151 Mitchell, supra note 149 at 580 [emphasis added]. 
 
152 Morrisey v Brewer (1972), 408 US 471. The Court found a violation of constitutional due process in 
the failure to give a parolee faced with revocation a simple factual hearing. 
 
153 Singh, supra note 2 at 209. 
 
154 Ibid at 210. 
 
155 Ibid at 226–7: these included the right not to be removed to a country where life or freedom is 
threatened (s. 55), the right to re-enter Canada if a safe country cannot be found (s. 14(1)(c)) and the right 
to be considered under the criteria provided in the Regulations for “employment authorization” while 
residing in Canada. 
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Rights.156 Accepting that “what is protected by the right to a fair hearing is the 
determination of one’s ‘rights and obligations’ whatever they are”157 Justice Beetz 
concluded that: 
 
[T]he process of determining the appellants’ refugee claims involved the 
determination of rights and obligations for which the appellants have, 
under s. 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, the right to a fair hearing in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. It follows also that 
this case is distinguishable from cases where a mere privilege was refused 
or revoked, such as Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Imigration, [1976] 
1 S.C.R. 376, and Mitchell v. The Queen, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 570.158 
 
Justice Beetz recognized that s. 2(e) of the Bill of Rights was engaged in Singh only 
because the appellants were able to point to rights, defined in the Immigration Act, 
1976, that were “determined” through the impugned refugee status determination 
regime. Had non-refoulement or re-entry been cast in discretionary terms as 
privileges instead of rights, the reasoning in Mitchell might have defeated Singh’s 
claim to protection under the Bill of Rights. The approach to the application of s. 7 
advocated by Justice Wilson avoids such a result under the Charter because it 
focuses on the consequences of denial of refugee status to the life, liberty and 
security of the person of those with a well-founded fear of persecution.159 
 
Thus, the deprivation of security of the person which arose from the risk of 
harm to the non-citizen if removed from Canada was aligned with the risks created 
by Canada’s failure to put in place an effective process to determine whether 
claimants were Convention refugees (resulting in a deprivation of their statutory 
right to have their status determined). However, it was not contingent on the 
existence of this statutory right. For reasons previously explained, Justice Wilson’s 
cautious approach may have been understandable in the context of Singh, an early 
decision from a court likely divided160 on whether s. 7 applied to Parliament’s 
control and regulation of non-citizens. It is no longer necessary or appropriate today. 
                                                 
156 Ibid at 227. Indeed, the Attorney General of Canada conceded that the determination of refugee claims 
involved the determination of rights of refugee claimants and that it was “only in that respect that his 
submissions with respect to s. 2(e)… differ from his submissions with regard to section 7 of the 
Charter…” 
 
157 Ibid at 228. 
 
158 Ibid [underlining added]. 
 
159 Her position finds resonance in the Supreme Court’s admonition, in Charkaoui, supra note 5 at para 
18, that “[in] determining whether s. 7 applies, we must look at the interest at stake rather than the legal 
label attached to the impugned legislation.” The Supreme Court was responding to the Canadian 
government's blanket claim, based on Medovarksi, supra note 4, that s. 7 could not apply in immigration 
proceedings. 
 
160 The fact that following the hearing of the appeal the Court asked the parties to address, through written 
arguments, the application of the Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c. 44 [Bill of Rights] and that three 
judges chose to allow the appeal based on a breach of s. 2(e) of the Bill of Rights strongly indicates that 
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Support for the view that a deprivation of life, liberty or security of the 
person should not hinge on proof of the denial of a statutory right is also found in the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration).161 Suresh examined whether a provision of the Immigration Act 
authorizing the deportation of a Convention refugee on security grounds even where 
the refugee’s life or freedom “would be threatened” by the return violated s. 7. The 
Court noted that it was conceded that “deportation to torture may deprive a refugee 
of liberty, security and perhaps life.”162 It reiterated the principle enunciated in the 
extradition context that the guarantee of fundamental justice applied “even to 
deprivations of life, liberty or security effected by actors other than our government, 
if there is a sufficient causal connection between our government’s participation and 
the deprivation ultimately effected.”163 In other words, whether s. 7 was engaged had 
to take into account not only the Minister’s act of deporting but “the possibility of 
grievous consequences such as torture and death, if a risk of those consequences is 
established.”164 Notably absent in Suresh is the notion that a deprivation of security 
of the person is contingent on the deprivation of a right conferred in relevant 
legislation. Indeed, Suresh had no unqualified statutory right not to be returned to a 
country where his life or freedom would be threatened. As a person found 
inadmissible on grounds of membership in an organization believed to be involved in 
terrorism, his right to non-refoulement was expressly subject to the minister’s broad 
discretion under s. 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act to issue an opinion that he should 
be removed because he constituted a danger to Canada’s security.  The Court 
recognized that deportation may involve a risk to the “fundamental right to be 
protected from torture or similar abuses,”165 grounded in the right not to be deprived 
of security of the person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice. To access the procedural protections of fundamental justice, the refugee 
needed to show that security of the person was engaged by showing not “proof of the 
risk of torture to that person,” but “a prima facie case that there may be a risk of 
torture upon deportation.”166 
 
The Charkaoui decision also supports the view that the right not to be 
deprived of security of the person except in accordance with fundamental justice is a 
freestanding constitutional right. The Court concluded that “the appellants’ 
challenges to the fairness of the process leading to possible deportation and the loss 
                                                                                                                   
the Court was divided on whether s. 7 of the Charter applied in Singh: Singh, supra note 2 at 185. Indeed, 
Justice Beetz refrained from expressing any view on whether the Charter was “applicable at all to the 
circumstances of these cases”: ibid, at 223–4. See also Dauvergne, Humanitarianism, Identity and Nation, 
supra note 47 at 186. 
 
161 Suresh, supra note 23. 
 
162 Ibid at para 44. 
 
163 Ibid at para 52. 
 
164 Ibid at para 52. 
 
165 Ibid at para 127. 
 
166 Ibid. See also Ahani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 2 at para 2, [2002] 
1 SCR 72 [Ahani]. 
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of liberty associated with detention raise important issues of liberty and security” and 
that “s. 7 of the Charter [was] engaged.”167 While it focused primarily on the impact 
of detention on Charkaoui’s liberty interest, the Court described the “issues of 
security” as follows: 
 
The detainee’s security may be further affected in various ways. The 
certificate process may lead to removal from Canada, to a place where his 
or her life or freedom would be threatened: see e.g. Singh … at p. 207, per 
Wilson J. A certificate may bring with it the accusation that one is a 
terrorist, which could cause irreparable harm to the individual, particularly 
if he or she is eventually deported to his or her home country. Finally, a 
person who is determined to be inadmissible on grounds of security loses 
the protection of s. 115(1) of the IRPA, which means that under s. 115(2), 
he or she can be deported to torture if the Minister is of the opinion that 
the person is a danger to the security of Canada.  
In Suresh …, this Court stated, at para. 76, that “barring 
extraordinary circumstances, deportation to torture will generally violate 
the principles of fundamental justice protected by s. 7 of the Charter.” … 
The appellants claim that they would be at risk of torture if deported to 
their countries of origin. But in each of their cases, this remains to be 
proven as part of an application for protection under the provisions of Part 
2 of the IRPA. The issue of deportation to torture is consequently not 
before us here.168 
 
The Court’s description of the security issues engaged in Charkaoui is 
noteworthy for three reasons. First, a named person’s security may be affected 
because “the certificate process may lead to removal from Canada, to a place where 
his or her life or freedom would be threatened.” The Court recognizes this effect of 
the certificate process on security despite the fact that, at the stage of assessing the 
reasonableness of the certificate, removal from Canada is not inevitable.169 It does 
not exclude the application of s. 7 because constitutional scrutiny may be applied at a 
subsequent stage of the proceedings. Second, Singh is cited in support of the 
proposition that security interests are engaged by a named person’s removal to a 
place where his life or freedom would be threatened; no mention is made of the fact 
that, in Singh, the deprivation of security of the person was linked to the denial of 
Singh’s statutory right to non-refoulement. As the Court notes, named persons 
determined to be inadmissible on security grounds do not benefit from a statutory 
protection against refoulement. Third, the Court’s observation that the appellants’ 
claim that they would be at risk of torture if deported to their countries of origin 
“remains to be proven as part of an application for protection under the provisions of 
Part 2 of the IRPA” and that the “issue of deportation to torture is consequently not 
                                                 
167 Charkaoui, supra note 5 at para 18. 
 
168 Ibid at paras 14–15. 
 
169 Ibid at para 14. See also para 18, where the Court associates Charkaoui’s “possible deportation” with 
engagement of his security interest. 
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before us”170 should not be taken to mean that the Court found that the appellants’ 
security of the person was not engaged by the certificate process.171 The Court 
clearly stated that features associated with deportation such as detention in the course 
of the certificate process “or the prospect of deportation to torture” may engage s. 7 
and ultimately concluded that s. 7 was engaged because the process raised 
“important issues of liberty and security.”172 Thus, the engagement of a security 
interest would not appear to be contingent on the outcome of the application for 
protection. The Court’s reference to the risk of torture remaining to be proven must 
also be read subject to its admonition, in Suresh, that engagement of security of the 
person did not require a “proof of the risk of torture” but a prima facie case that there 
may be a risk.173 
 
Based on the preceding analysis, it is open to non-citizens to claim that their 
s. 7 right to security of the person is engaged in circumstances where deportation 
places them at risk of persecution, torture or cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment, whether or not exposing them to this risk of harm also violates their 
statutory rights. In other words, the right not to be deprived of one’s security of the 
person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice is a 
freestanding constitutional right. 
 
What of the impact of Medovarksi? I earlier argued that a possible, though 
unarticulated, justification for the Court’s finding that the deportation of non-citizens 
cannot in itself implicate s. 7 interests – that deportation does not violate the mobility 
rights of non-citizens and thus cannot violate other Charter rights – does not stand 
up to scrutiny. In any event, the Supreme Court has qualified this finding by 
allowing in Charkaoui that deportation proceedings were not immune from s. 7 
scrutiny and that “some features associated with deportation, such as detention in the 
course of the certificate process or the prospect of deportation to torture” may engage 
s. 7. In other words, in certain circumstances, the nature of the impact of deportation 
on an affected person may trigger that person’s security of the person interests, 
whether in its physical or psychological dimensions. Thus, where the deportation of 
individuals suffering from medical conditions “clinically significant to their current 
and future health” would deprive them of access to essential health care, security of 
the person should be engaged as it was for those citizens denied access to timely 
health care in Chaoulli.174 Lorne Waldman suggests that, in this sense, Medovarksi 
and Charkaoui could be read consistently with the Supreme Court’s approach to the 
                                                 
170 Ibid at para 15. 
 
171 The Federal Court of Appeal appeared to suggest as much in JP v Canada (Minister of Public Safety 
and Emergency Preparedness); B306 v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness); 
Hernandez v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 FCA 262 at paras 
120–22, 368 DLR (4th) 524 [B306].  
 
172 Ibid at para 18 [emphasis added]. 
 
173 Suresh, supra note 23 at para 127. 
 
174 See, on this question, Lorne Waldman, “The Charter of Rights and its Application in Immigration 
Proceedings”, (Paper delivered at the 10th Annual Conference of the Canadian Association of Refugee 
Lawyers, Toronto, 21 March 2016) at 39–41 [unpublished]. 
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application of s. 7 in Blencoe, “where the Court held that in a non-criminal context, 
questions of the engagement of s. 7 must be considered on a case-by-case basis 
considering the serious impact of the state-imposed psychological stress on the 
individual.”175 It is certainly conceivable that deportation may produce a serious and 
profound effect on a person’s psychological integrity by interfering in profoundly 
intimate and personal choices, including a parent’s interest in raising and caring for a 
child, recognized by the Supreme Court as engaging security of the person in the 
context of child custody proceedings.176 
 
I have argued that the Supreme Court should approach the question of 
whether proceedings leading to the deportation of non-citizens engage their liberty 
and security of the person in a manner consistent with its broad definition of these 
interests in contexts other than immigration and refugee protection. Similarly, in the 
next section, I claim that the Court’s apparent refusal to find that s. 7 is engaged by 
decisions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that do not immediately 
precede removal conflicts with the more relaxed standard of causation it adopted in 
Bedford. 
 
 
3. Causation 
 
Canadian courts’ response to non-citizens’ claim that their liberty or security of the 
person are engaged by decisions taken at preliminary stages of the administrative 
process eventually leading to removal is that s. 7 does not apply because these 
interests are more directly engaged and considered in the stages of this process that 
immediately precede removal. This prematurity “principle” was best described by 
Justice John Evans, then a judge of the Federal Court Trial Division, in Jekula v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).177 Jekula, a Liberian citizen 
recognized in Sierra Leone as a refugee, claimed refugee status in Canada but was 
found ineligible as a person recognized as a Convention refugee by a country other 
than Canada to which he could be returned. An exclusion order was issued against 
him on the grounds he did not have authorization to remain in Canada. Justice Evans 
                                                 
175 Ibid at 25. See also Galloway & Liew, supra note 91 at 656. 
 
176 G(J), supra note 14. The contrary outcome, which prevails under American jurisprudence, is that 
parents have constitutional rights where “the state seeks to take their children” but no such rights “if they 
or their children face separation as a result of one or the other’s deportation” – an odd result, as 
Kanstroom notes, which flows from the lack of a “unified theory of constitutional punishment”: 
Kanstroom, supra note 118 at 1934. An argument could be made that s. 7 cannot be engaged by the 
psychological impact of deportation on parents who “choose” to leave their Canadian-born children in 
Canada because, due to their intervening choice, the state would not be directly responsible for the 
interference with their ability to nurture their children. This argument ignores that, under the test for 
causation set out in Bedford, supra note 34 at para 76, parents need show only a sufficient causal 
connection between the state’s action and the prejudice they have suffered, not that the state action is the 
only or even the dominant cause. 
 
177 Jeluka v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 1 FCR 266, 47 Imm LR (2d) 218 
[Jekula]. 
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held that the first step in a s. 7 analysis was to ask whether the “administrative action 
under review… deprive[d] the applicant of the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person.”178 In his opinion, the eligibility decision did not have this effect: 
 
First, while it is true that a finding of ineligibility deprives the claimant of 
access to an important right, namely the right to have a claim determined 
by the Refugee Division, this right is not included in “the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person”: Berrahma […] at page 213; Nguyen 
[…] 
Second, it may well be a breach of the rights protected by section 7 for the 
government to return a non-citizen to a country where she fears that she is 
likely to be subjected to physical violence or imprisoned. However, a 
determination that a refugee claimant is not eligible to have access to the 
Refugee Division is merely one step in the administrative process that may 
lead eventually to removal from Canada. The procedure followed at the 
risk assessment to which the applicant will be entitled under section 53 
before she is removed can be subject to constitutional scrutiny to ensure 
that it complies with the principles of fundamental justice, even though the 
procedure is not prescribed in the Act or regulations: Kaberuka […] at 
page 271. Moreover, while holding that it was not inconsistent with 
section 7 for the Immigration Act to limit access to the Refugee Division, 
Marceau J.A. also said in Nguyen […] at pages 708-709: 
It would be my opinion, however, that the Minister 
would act in direct violation of the Charter if he 
purported to execute a deportation order by forcing the 
individual concerned back to a country where, on the 
evidence, torture and possibly death will be inflicted. It 
would be, it seems to me . . . at the very least, an 
outrage to public standards of decency, in violation of 
the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 of 
the Charter. 
In summary, section 7 rights are not engaged at the eligibility 
determination and exclusion order stages of the process. However, the 
applicant cannot be lawfully removed from Canada without an assessment 
of the risks that she may face if returned to Sierra Leone. And the manner 
in which that assessment is conducted must comply with the principles of 
fundamental justice.179 
 
While Justice Evans relies on Nguyen for the proposition that s. 7 is not 
engaged at the eligibility determination and exclusion order stages of the process set 
out under the Immigration Act, his judgment does not advert to the fact that, as noted 
earlier, both the Federal Court of Appeal in Nguyen and the Federal Court Trial 
Division in Kaberuka, also cited in Jekula, had concluded that the scheme as a whole 
did in fact engage s. 7 of the Charter. However, Justice Evans’ decision is most 
remarkable because it segments the “administrative process that may lead eventually 
to removal from Canada” into discrete steps and posits that s. 7 should only apply to 
those steps which immediately precede the applicant’s deportation. This approach 
was later taken up by the Federal Court of Appeal in deciding, in Poshteh v Canada 
                                                 
178 Ibid at para 31. 
 
179 Ibid at paras 31–33. 
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(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),180 that s. 7 was not engaged by a 
determination of inadmissibility. The Immigration Division of the IRB had 
determined that Poshteh was inadmissible to Canada under s. 34(1)(f) of IRPA on the 
grounds that, as a child, he had been a member of a terrorist organization in Iran. 
While the appeal was mainly concerned with whether Poshteh was a member of the 
organization and whether his status as a minor was relevant to this determination, 
Justice Rothstein commented on Poshteh’s claim that, even though his life, liberty 
and security of the person were not engaged in the proceeding, IRPA should “be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.” Justice 
Rothstein determined that the inadmissibility decision did not engage s. 7, relying on 
Barrera (a problematic precedent, as noted earlier181) but also pointing to the fact 
that other proceedings were more proximate to his deportation: 
 
[A]ll that is being determined is whether Mr. Poshteh is inadmissible to 
Canada on the grounds of his membership in a terrorist organization. The 
authorities are to the effect that a finding of inadmissibility does not 
engage an individual’s section 7 Charter rights. (See, for example, 
Barrera v. Canada (MCI) (1992), 99 D.L.R. (4th) 264 (F.C.A.).) A 
number of proceedings may yet take place before he reaches the stage at 
which his deportation from Canada may occur. For example, Mr. Poshteh 
may invoke subsection 34(2) to try to satisfy the Minister that his presence 
in Canada is not detrimental to the national interest. Therefore, 
fundamental justice in section 7 of the Charter is not of application in the 
determination to be made under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act.182 
 
This reasoning183 was recently on display in obiter statements by the 
Supreme Court in B010 v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration).184 B010 and other 
Tamil refugee claimants from Sri Lanka arrived in Canada on a dilapidated cargo 
ship. The Immigration and Refugee Board (Immigration Division) found them 
inadmissible under s. 37(1)(b) of the IRPA on grounds of organized criminal people 
smuggling. As a result, their refugee claims were ineligible to be referred to the RPD 
for consideration on their merits.185 For a unanimous court, Chief Justice McLachlin 
concluded that s. 37(1)(b) targeted “procuring illegal entry in order to obtain, directly 
or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit in the context of transnational 
                                                 
180 Poshteh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 85, [2005] FCR 487 
[Poshteh]. 
 
181 See the text accompanying note 64. 
 
182 Poshteh, supra note 180 at para 63. 
 
183 See also Torre v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 48 at para 4; and Brar v 
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FC 1214 at para 21, 273 ACWS 
(3d) 603. 
 
184 B010, supra note 6. 
 
185 IRPA, supra note 25 at s 101(1)(f); B010, supra note 6 at para 14. 
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organized crime.”186 The appellants, who merely aided in the illegal entry of other 
asylum-seekers in the course of their collective flight to safety, were not “people 
smugglers.”187 Accordingly, while it decided that it was unnecessary to address the 
appellants’ alternative argument that s. 37(1)(b) was overbroad and violated s. 7 of 
the Charter, the Court noted in obiter that this argument could not assist them “as s. 
7 of the Charter is not engaged at the stage of determining admissibility under s. 
37(1)”: 
 
This Court recently held in Febles v. Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2014 SCC 68, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 431, that a determination of 
exclusion from refugee protection under the IRPA did not engage s. 7, 
because “even if excluded from refugee protection, the appellant is able to 
apply for a stay of removal to a place if he would face death, torture or 
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if removed to that place” (para. 
67). It is at this subsequent pre-removal risk assessment stage of the 
IRPA’s refugee protection process that s. 7 is typically engaged. The 
rationale from Febles, which concerned determinations of “exclusion” 
from refugee status, applies equally to determinations of “inadmissibility” 
to refugee status under the IRPA.188 
 
The Court’s reliance on Febles as authority for the proposition that 
“exclusion from refugee protection under the IRPA did not engage s. 7” is 
problematic. Febles focused on the interpretation of article 1F(b) of the Refugee 
Convention189 which excludes from the protection of the Convention any person with 
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that “he has committed a 
serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to 
that country as a refugee.” Article 1F(b) was directly incorporated into Canadian law 
through s. 98 of IRPA, which provides that a person excluded under sections E or F 
of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or person in need 
of protection. Responding to Febles’ argument that a narrow interpretation of s. 98 
should be adopted because it was consistent with the Charter, the Supreme Court 
held that its broader interpretation of the provision was consistent with the Charter, 
since excluded persons could apply for a pre-removal risk assessment or could 
challenge their removal to a country where their Charter rights are jeopardized 
pursuant to the principles set out in Suresh:190  
 
While the appellant would prefer to be granted refugee protection than 
have to apply for a stay of removal, the Charter does not give a positive 
right to refugee protection. The appellant is excluded from refugee 
protection as a result of his commission of serious non-political crimes. If 
                                                 
186 B010, supra note 6 at para 72. 
 
187 Ibid. 
 
188 Ibid at para 75. 
 
189 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 June 1969, Can TS 1969 No 6. 
 
190 Febles v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 SCC 68 at para 67, [2014] 3 SCR 
431 [Febles]. 
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removal of the appellant to Cuba jeopardizes his Charter rights, his 
recourse is to seek a stay of removal, as discussed earlier.191 
 
While Febles may be read as affirming that a provision restricting the authority of 
the IRB to grant refugee status to excluded persons does not in itself violate their s. 7 
rights, the Court did not expressly find that s. 7 was not even engaged because their 
liberty or security of the person were not engaged. It certainly supplied no reasoning 
to justify such a conclusion. A more plausible reading of Febles is that while s. 7 of 
the Charter may be engaged by the process to which Febles was subjected, he had 
not shown that his exclusion from proceedings that would result in a grant of refugee 
protection violated fundamental justice because the IRPA provided alternate avenues 
by which his security of the person interests could be addressed and protected. Is 
there another basis, apart from Febles, for the Court’s obiter views in B010 that s. 7 
is not engaged in determinations of inadmissibility to or exclusion from refugee 
status? The Court’s rationale mirrors that set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in 
one of the two decisions appealed from in B010.192 Quoting at length from Jekula, 
the Federal Court of Appeal had determined that s. 7 of the Charter would only be 
engaged at “a stage under the process in IRPA which is subsequent to the 
inadmissibility finding.”193 
 
What can we make of the claim that s. 7 does not apply in the IRPA’s 
administrative process so long as other “steps” or proceedings are available before a 
non-citizen reaches the stage at which deportation from Canada may occur? As 
revealed in the discussion of decision making in the extradition and penal contexts in 
section 2, above, this logic has not prevailed in the context of other multi-stage 
proceedings that may result in detention or imprisonment. What reasoning underlies 
the claim that an ineligibility determination or a finding of inadmissibility does not 
attract s. 7 protection because it is merely one step in the administrative process that 
may lead eventually to removal from Canada, with others to follow? The argument 
appears to be that s. 7 is not engaged at that step because there are steps later in the 
process more directly and foreseeably linked to a deprivation of a non-citizen’s s. 7 
interests where the person’s circumstances can be scrutinized to ensure that this 
deprivation complies with the principles of fundamental justice. This reasoning 
implies a standard of causation more onerous than the “sufficient causal connection” 
standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Bedford. It requires that state action be a 
foreseeable and necessary cause of the prejudice to the person’s s. 7 interests – a 
standard expressly rejected in Bedford. It is instructive to contrast this approach to 
Justice Marceau’s decision, in Nguyen, to examine the eligibility determination in the 
context of the scheme viewed as a whole: 
 
                                                 
191 Ibid at para 68. 
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193 Ibid at para 125. 
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[W]hile a determination of ineligibility… is only indirectly linked to the 
deportation order, nevertheless it has the effect of taking away the only 
possible barrier to the issuance of an unconditional deportation order, and 
as such participates in the deprivation of liberty and, possibly, the security 
of the individual which results from deportation.194 
 
Justice Marceau’s approach is consistent with the “sufficient causal connection” test 
which, “sensitive to the context of the particular case,” does not require that the 
impugned government action – here, the eligibility determination – be the only or the 
dominant cause of the claimant’s prejudice. It is also consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s own approach in Charkaoui, where it raised the impact of the security 
certificate process on Charkaoui’s security of the person, recognizing that s. 7 was 
engaged because this process raised “important issues of liberty and security” despite 
the fact that removal from Canada was not inevitable at the stage of the proceedings 
subject to constitutional scrutiny in that case – the designated judge’s assessment of 
the security certificate’s reasonableness. 
 
The approach to the engagement of s. 7 that underlies Jekula and the 
Supreme Court’s obiter comments in B010 is not, as required by Bedford, sensitive 
to the context of the particular case. It artificially reduces the “immigration context” 
to a set of discrete processes whose impact on non-citizens’ liberty and security of 
the person can be analyzed independently and in isolation from the overarching 
regime of immigration control to which they are subjected under IRPA. In Canadian 
Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (Attorney General),195 Federal Court Justice 
Anne Mactavish described the immigration context in more realistic terms. One of 
the issues in that case was whether the Government of Canada’s decision to 
withdraw health care coverage for certain refugee claimants constituted “treatment” 
for the purposes of the prohibition in s. 12 of the Charter against subjecting 
individuals to “any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” Justice Mactavish 
noted that to constitute “treatment”, positive actions, inaction or prohibitions by the 
state affecting a rights claimant had to be part of an active state process involving an 
exercise of state control over that individual:196 
 
In this case, those seeking the protection of Canada are under immigration 
jurisdiction, and as such are effectively under the administrative control of 
the state. Some claimants may be detained, and obligations such as 
reporting requirements may be imposed upon others. In addition, their 
rights and opportunities (such as their right to work or their ability to 
receive social assistance benefits) may be limited in a number of different 
ways by the state. Indeed, their entitlement to a range of benefits is wholly 
dependent upon decisions made by various branches of the Government of 
Canada as to their right to seek protection, and the ultimate success of 
their claims for protection.197 
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Canada’s immigration law can more realistically be seen as an instrument of 
social control, with deportation as a “method of continual control” of non-citizens’ 
behaviour.198 Under this model, proceedings under IRPA can be usefully compared 
to a system of railway lines, some of which, as Justice Evans observes, ultimately 
lead to removal from Canada. Along the way, switches or turnouts could allow the 
train to move from the mainline, heading towards removal, to a secondary line or 
even to a siding. These correspond to various proceedings, like eligibility, that 
provide opportunities to avoid removal through a process by which they may gain 
refugee protection or that require decision-makers to consider additional factors that 
could weigh against removal and that might not be considered at a later stage. As 
Justice Marceau recognized, when these switches are closed and a non-citizen is 
denied access to these proceedings, the likelihood of removal and the risk of 
deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person increase. This increased risk 
meets the standard of causation required by the Supreme Court in Bedford to 
establish engagement of s. 7. 
 
What may animate decisions like Jekula is the courts’ concern that if they 
recognize that s. 7 is engaged by decisions made at each and every stage prior to 
removal, non-citizens will seek to judicially review every decision on the ground that 
it infringes their rights to liberty and security of the person, paralyzing IRPA’s 
enforcement. This is by no means the inevitable or even likely outcome of 
recognizing s. 7 engagement through a principled application of the s. 7 framework 
developed by the Supreme Court in other contexts, including the Bedford standard of 
causation. The Federal Court has the discretion to refuse to entertain an application 
for judicial review where an adequate alternative remedy in the form of an internal or 
external appeal or other statutory mechanism is available to the applicant.199 Rather 
than holding that s. 7 is not engaged in immigration and refugee protection 
proceedings that do not immediately precede removal, a position inconsistent with 
the standard of causation adopted by the Supreme Court, a court could decline to 
entertain an application for judicial review based on s. 7 of the Charter on the 
ground that the applicant’s s. 7 rights to life, liberty or security of the person would 
be considered in a subsequent adequate alternative proceeding. However, before 
dismissing an application on this ground, the court would have to satisfy itself that 
this proceeding was “adequate”, providing the non-citizen with a fair hearing before 
a decision maker with the independence and statutory authority to substantially 
address life, liberty and security of the person claims and to provide an appropriate 
remedy.200 
                                                 
198 Kanstroom, supra note 118 at 1898. 
 
199 David J Mullan, “The Discretionary Nature of Judicial Review” in RJ Sharpe & K Roach, eds, Taking 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
The Supreme Court’s current approach to the application of s. 7 in the immigration 
and refugee protection context is inconsistent with its approach to s. 7 engagement in 
other legal regimes. No principled and transparent reasons have yet been offered to 
justify this discrepancy. Liberty is engaged in removal proceedings under IRPA 
because this statute effectively establishes an administrative regime to control non-
citizens in large measure through the threat of their forced removal from Canada and 
exposes them to the possibility of detention in order to carry out this threat. 
Moreover, deportation may in certain circumstances engage non-citizens’ liberty in 
its broad sense by preventing them from making fundamental personal choices that 
go beyond the bare assertion of a right to mobility. Non-citizens’ security of the 
person is engaged where deportation would place them at risk of physical or serious 
and profound psychological harm, including that caused by the resulting interference 
with their profoundly intimate and personal choices, regardless of whether this also 
involves the breach of their statutory rights. Finally, as in other contexts where there 
is a risk of state deprivation of liberty or security of the person, and consistently with 
the relaxed standard of causation adopted by the Supreme Court in Bedford, courts 
should recognize that these s. 7 interests are engaged in the early stages of the 
administrative process and not only at the stage most proximate to deportation. 
 
Will a principled approach to the application of s. 7 make any real 
difference for non-citizens seeking to challenge their removal from Canada? After 
all, in a legion of cases, including Chiarelli and Medovarski, courts have held that, 
even assuming that liberty and security of the person are engaged, the removal of 
non-citizens would not breach any principle of fundamental justice. As Binnie and 
LeBel JJ. observed in Chaoulli: 
 
Claimants whose life, liberty or security of the person is put at risk are 
entitled to relief only to the extent that their complaint arises from a 
breach of an identifiable principle of fundamental justice. The real control 
over the scope and operation of s. 7 is to be found in the requirement that 
the applicant identify a violation of a principle of fundamental justice.201 
 
At its most basic level, my argument is that courts should consistently apply 
the same principles to define the scope of the life, liberty and security of the person 
interests of citizens and non-citizens because these relate to our basic and common 
humanity – the same essential insight that underlies Justice Wilson’s decision, in 
Singh, that s. 7 applies to every human being present in Canada and thus amenable to 
Canadian law.202 A review of the jurisprudence on the application of s. 7 in the 
                                                                                                                   
200 For a recent review of courts’ discretionary remedial powers on judicial review, see Gerald Heckman, 
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immigration and refugee protection context reveals no principled or compelling 
justification for a contrary view. Once they recognize that s. 7 is engaged by the 
deportation of non-citizens, courts can address the real question: whether deportation 
is fundamentally just in individual cases. It is to this question that I devote my 
concluding remarks. 
 
While it may be true that the scope of fundamental justice – whether the 
deprivation of a non-citizen’s liberty or security of the person by the state is just or 
unjust – is influenced by the “immigration context,”203 including the power of the 
state, subject to international norms, to decide who it will admit to its territory, the 
impact of “context” on fundamental justice has its limits. Principles of fundamental 
justice “set out minimum requirements that a law that negatively impacts on a 
person’s life, liberty or security must meet”204 and are about “the basic values 
underpinning our constitutional order”: “The s. 7 analysis is concerned with 
capturing inherently bad laws: that is, laws that take away life, liberty or security of 
the person in a way that runs afoul of our basic values. The principles of fundamental 
justice are an attempt to capture those values.”205 
 
In Bedford, the Court was concerned with the basic values against 
arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality. Laws or state acts run afoul 
of these basic values when the means by which the state seeks to attain its objective 
is fundamentally flawed because its effects on s. 7 interests are not rationally 
connected, in whole or in part, or grossly disproportionate to their objective. While 
the immigration context may supply the various state objectives against which 
rational connection and proportionality are to be measured, it does not alter the basic 
values at play. The Court’s view that Parliament’s choice to deport a non-citizen 
convicted of a serious crime is not arbitrary206 may be defensible in light of the 
IRPA’s objective of maintaining the security of Canadian society.207 However, the 
conclusion that fundamental justice does not require consideration of any mitigating 
circumstances beyond the non-citizen’s conviction overlooks the fact that 
deportation may impact his s. 7 interests in a manner grossly disproportionate to the 
                                                                                                                   
“even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination, 
prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise”: Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment 15, The Position of Aliens under the Covenant (27th sess 1986), available in Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (1994) UN 
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state’s purpose and violate a basic value underpinning Canada’s constitutional 
order.208 
 
The impact of context on procedural norms of fundamental justice is 
similarly limited. The principles of fundamental justice demand, at a minimum, 
compliance with the common law duty of procedural fairness. The specific 
procedural safeguards they require depend on several factors linked to the “context 
of the statute involved and the rights affected.”209 The Supreme Court has stated, for 
example, that to conform to fundamental justice, security certificate procedures 
“must reflect the exigencies of the security context”210 and the need to protect 
information and evidence critical to national security,211 militating in favour of more 
limited disclosure to the named person. However, it has recognized that “the 
seriousness of the individual interests at stake”212 also form part of the contextual 
analysis and that the principles of fundamental justice cannot be reduced to the point 
where they “cease to provide the protection of due process that lies at the heart of s. 
7 of the Charter.”213 
 
Liberty and security of the person may be engaged where individuals are 
subjected to the threat of detention or other statutory compulsions or to laws or 
government acts that adversely impact their physical and psychological well-being or 
interfere with inherently personal choices that go to the core of what it means to 
enjoy individual dignity and independence. The fact that the legal authority for such 
compulsions and government acts is found in the IRPA should have no bearing on 
whether s. 7 of the Charter is engaged. Canadian courts should recognize non-
citizens’ full right to liberty and security of the person under the Charter and focus 
on the key question in immigration and refugee protection decision making: whether 
the state has interfered with those fundamental interests pursuant to a fair process 
and in a manner rationally connected and proportionate to the objectives of Canada’s 
immigration laws. 
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